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 Since Viktor Orbán came back to power as Hungary’s Prime Minister in 2010, his 
policies have caused a lot of indignation across the Western media and governments (Ash 
2019; Horowitz and Karasz 2018; Lehotai 2020). Within the context of democratic 
backsliding, a rapprochement with Putin’s Russia is perceived to be suspicious (Janjevic 
2018). Orbán’s growing interest in Russia since 2010 was particularly puzzling due to his 
anti-Russian stance in the past. The U-turn initially kick-started from an “Eastern Opening” 
policy which was supposed to boost trade with Eastern countries, such as China, Japan, South 
Korea, Singapore and Russia. The relationship with Russia landed itself at predominantly 
energy trade turnover with some of the bilateral deals causing major corruption suspicions. 
The latter ones are the result of high-scale opaque agreements, such as the intergovernmental 
Paks nuclear plant deal. A certain degree of ideological convergence between Budapest with 
Moscow ‘pours some more oil into the flames’. Media headlines call the relationship between 
the leaders as “Eastern bromance” (Bozsik and Amiel 2019) and label Hungary as Russia’s 
‘Trojan horse’ (Müller 2014).  
 This study aims to explore and critically analyze what might be considered as the 
actual foundations of the relationship. By reviewing the existing theoretical literature, it 
provides its version of patron-client theory as a prism for the case study. The theoretical 
framework is applied in three phases using textual thematic analysis across the sources. The 
first phase assesses Hungary’s energy insecurity perception in the strategic documentation. 
The second phase looks at the inequality and reciprocity aspects of its energy tie with Russia. 
Reciprocity is analyzed through key issues of bilateral energy relations such as gas deals, 
pipelines cooperation and Paks deal. The third phase of the research deals with the conceptual 
part of the relationship – it analyzes proximity in the leaders’ rhetorical discourse. The results 
demonstrate that energy insecurity drives Hungary into Russia’s orbit. The relationship is 
further reinforced through mutually beneficial and favourable energy deals and proximity-
enhancing rhetoric from the leaders. In sum, the research gives a fresh look at the relationship 
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 Russo-Hungarian bilateral relations have seen an intensification in the past decade. 
The proximity has been especially vivid since Viktor Orbán’s return to the cabinet as Prime-
Minister of Hungary in 2010. Historical context surrounding Russia and Hungary includes 
such events as Russians’ help in the suppression of 1848 Hungarian revolution, 46 years of 
Russian military presence in Hungary (1945-91), Soviets’ support for the establishment and 
maintenance of Communist regime in Hungary, and a Soviet suppression of 1956 Hungarian 
revolution (Hegedűs 2016, p.3). These though seem to be present only in Hungarian’s society 
historical memory – the official discourse of the countries’ current governments does not pick 
up on these traumatic events. As much as the relationship is enjoyed by the sides, it is not 
applauded and happily met by some third-parties. The Western counterparts, the European 
Union, in particular, have regularly raised concerns about the strengthening relationship. They 
perceive it as part of the so-called spreading ‘Russian influence’ in Europe (Hopkins et. al 
2019). There are also concerns regarding an ideological attraction from Hungarian side - 
Orbán’s turn to ‘illiberal democracy’ model of governance perceived by some as inspired by 
Putin’s policies in Russia (Jovanovski 2014). The employed accusative narratives have gone 
as far as labelling Hungary, “Russia’s Trojan Horse” (Müller 2014), aimed at bringing in the 
disruption of unity into the European Union. The Hungarian side, in turn, refers to the 
relationship as purely pragmatic (Szabó 2019), in which the Hungarian government follows 
what is called the country’s ‘national interest’ (Kovács 2019). Beneficial gas deals with 
Russian Gazprom and Paks nuclear plant 30-years deal are just some of the projects that are 
claimed to have been made in pursuit of Hungarian national interest. This constant advocacy 
of bilateral relationship backed-up by ‘national interest’ arguments brings in analytical 
difficulties – the distinction between the legitimate pursuit of national interest and behaviour 
that raises suspicions of Russian influence and corruption is blurred (Hegedűs 2016, p.4).  
 Considering the increased attention of the international actors and media to the 
relationship, the topic of the current Russo-Hungarian relations is relevant and interesting. 
The objective of this study is to explore the bilateral tie in a new unprecedented way. 
However, in order to do so, it is essential to identify the ways that the scholarship has already 





Chapter 1. Literature review 
 This literature review aims at exploring what academia has to say about the current 
Russo-Hungarian bilateral relations. In particular, it covers the literature that is looking at the 
period since Viktor Orbán’s return to the PM’s cabinet in 2010. However, the academic 
interest in the topic seems to have increased in 2014 when bilateral relations intensified as 
well – with the making of the Paks deal being one of the pinpoints of this intensification. 
Hence, the date range of the sources adheres mostly to the 2014-2020 period. By adopting a 
thematic approach, the literature review demonstrates that there are several streamline 
concepts through which academia analyzes Russo-Hungarian relations. In particular, the 
authors focus a lot on such aspects of the relations as ‘Eastern opening’, energy dependence, 
Paks nuclear deal; some approach the analysis through the prism of ideological proximity 
between countries’ leaderships; some look at the intensification of the relations vis-à-vis 
Hungary’s frictions within the EU. Considering these streamline ideas discovered in the 
literature, the organization of the literature review proceeds as follows. Firstly, it looks at the 
evidence of the relations being elite-driven. Secondly, it looks at the part of the scholarship 
which analyzed the relations within the framework of economic relations and the policy of 
‘Eastern Opening’ in particular. The third part focuses on the group of scholars who focused 
on energy relations. This section contains a follow-up sub-section on Paks deal. Another part 
of the literature review looks at a rather non-tangible aspect of the relations – ideological 
proximity. The review also contains a section that covers the authors who looked at Russo-
Hungarian relations vis-à-vis Hungary’s EU membership. Finally, the chapter will conclude 
with the summarizing arguments the authors use to describe Hungary-Russia relations.   
1.1. Elite-driven rapprochement 
 There is a bundle of studies that agrees on the fact that the current Hungarian 
government’s orientation towards Russia is driven by the elites (Ámon and Deák 2015; 
Hegedűs 2016; Deák and Weiner 2019). In other words, according to these authors, 
Hungary’s turn to Russia was not a ‘bottom-up’ initiation, i.e. it did not come up from the 
grassroots – neither from the interest groups nor from the public. For example, Hegedűs 
(2016, p.1) argues that these are not traditional Russian measures like propaganda and ‘media 
warfare’ targeting public opinion that define Hungary’s pro-Russian stance. In contrast, 
counter to public opinion, the orientation toward Russia is spearheaded by the political and 
business elite in Hungary (Ibid., p.1). Similarly, Ámon and Deák (2015, p.87) claim that the 
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government “can be labelled as the main “Russia lobby” – it advocates for the strengthening 
of business ties more than any other corporate group. The authors call the relations between 
the countries “business relations without businessmen” (Ibid., p.87) since political elites have 
a leading role in the matter of ties to Russia. Deák and Weiner (2019) trace back how this 
came into being. They credit the intensification of bilateral relations back to the South Stream 
pipeline negotiations. The authors argue that the project served as a catalyst for bilateral 
relations. Namely, before Russia did not have any influential ‘middlemen’ in local elites that 
could shape high-scale bilateral agenda, relations with Fidesz had to be built from scratch in 
2012 due to Orbán’s anti-Russian rhetoric in the past (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.7). Since the 
gas value chain was privatized in Hungary, there was no platform on which Hungarian senior 
decision-makers and Russia could negotiate on gas matters. This had been the case until 
Orbán conducted nationalization campaign and raised MVM to a state-owned energy 
champion, hence, creating for his cabinet a full mandate on gas matters. Meanwhile, the South 
Stream, in particular, “its political preparations attracted the attention of local political elites 
and established a permanent system of high-level meetings and contacts” (Ibid.). That is, the 
frequent high-level meetings between two sides is a rather recent development, as according 
to the authors. In short, the literature pertaining to the agents behind Russia-Hungary 
rapprochement strongly suggests that the current bilateral relations are primarily spearheaded 
and led by the political elite. 
1.2. Economic interest and “Eastern Opening” 
 A considerable body of literature agrees that Russo-Hungarian relations are driven by 
economic considerations on Hungary’s side (Ámon and Deák 2015; Deák et. al 2015; 
Buzogány 2017; Deák and Weiner 2019) while the policy of ‘Eastern Opening’ played a 
crucial role in giving these considerations the utmost priority (Végh 2015; Győri 2019). As 
per trade, Russia is Hungary’s 3rd most important partner for imports, but only 13th for exports 
(Hegedűs 2016, p.1). The 3rd place in imports’ ranking is secured predominantly by crude oil 
and natural gas imports from Russia that constitute 89% and 57% of the Hungarian 
consumption respectively. Hence, apart from oil and gas, which are, in essence, related to the 
energy sector, the trade turnover between Russia and Hungary is insignificant in comparison 
to figures that are produced in the result of trade with their other trading partners. That is why, 
Ámon and Deák claim that (2015, p.87) “the economic component in this strong 
transformation [Orbán’s and Fidesz’s turn to Russia] is hard to grasp, but supposedly it played 
a major role”.  The reason why the academics refer to Hungary’s foreign policy’s inclination 
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towards Russia as ‘strong transformation’, ‘turn-around’ or ‘U-turn’ lies in Orbán’s past anti-
Russian rhetoric. Orbán’s government in 1998-2002 was anti-Russian and throughout the 
2000s while in opposition he pursued an anti-Russian sentiment in rhetoric (Buzogány 2017, 
p.1315), criticizing the previous Prime-Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány for supporting the South 
Stream pipeline project and friendly relations with Putin. While Orbán’s rhetoric was anti-
Russian, Hungary overall was assessed as a ‘friendly pragmatist’ in 2007 by a study of EU 
countries’ relations with Russia (Leonard and Popescu 2007, p.36). Hence, it came rather as a 
surprise that later on during his 2nd and 3rd cabinet Orbán placed Russia as one of the main 
foreign policy vectors.  Several authors (Deák et. al 2015; Végh 2015; Buzogány 2017; Győri 
2019) suggest that Orbán’s “U-turn” to Russia can be certainly prescribed to 2010 when he 
announced an “Eastern Opening”.  
Despite ending as a failure, a number of authors (Ámon and Deák 2015; Juhász et. al 
2015; Végh 2015; Buzogány 2017) have recognized that the “Eastern Opening” laid the 
foundation for further closer cooperation with Russia. Putting it simply, the new foreign 
policy direction intended to strengthen economic relations with the Eastern countries, 
including East Asian ones, Russia, and China. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
reorganized into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to reflect the importance of trade 
in the newly selected foreign policy course. Russia and China got separate departments 
responsible for them. Starting from 2013, so-called trade houses were established 
internationally to facilitate the trade, as well as specific diplomatic posts were created to deal 
with economic affairs (Végh 2015, p.52; Juhász et. al 2015, p.13). The number of Orbán’s 
visits to countries in that part of the world largely increased, overwhelming even the number 
of visits into West and Central European partners (Buzogány 2017, p.1317). Alas, the policy 
did not end up in a success: 
However, despite all the diplomatic efforts, business figures remain 
disappointing. From the business point of view, the policy of the Eastern 
Opening is a failure; having lost its original meaning, it is increasingly becoming 
an instrument of an ideological fight for freedom, waged by the Hungarian 
government against the West, and a tool for developing closer political ties to 
Eastern “illiberal democracies.” All this is forcefully reflected in the Prime 
Minister’s speeches and in government communication, emphasizing the crisis 
of Western civilization, its economic decline, and the imperious power of 





Although Juhász et. al’s argumentation about the larger picture behind the Eastern Opening 
might be slightly overstretched, the assessment they gave to the role of the Eastern Opening in 
boosting trade with Russia is shared by other scholars. Indeed, when it comes to Russia, Végh 
(2015, p.54) assesses Russo-Hungarian trade relations as “very limited, highly asymmetric 
and one-dimensional”, since the major component of trade is composed of Russian oil and gas 
exports accounting up to 90% of total trade turnover between the two countries. However, one 
thing cannot be taken away from the equation - the Eastern Opening played an important role 
in shifting foreign policy priorities, it has been discussed by several authors. Namely, it put 
economic priorities at the core of foreign policy. According to Ámon and Deák (2015, p.87), 
in 2014 after a landslide victory at the meeting with the heads of foreign missions, Orbán 
proclaimed a streamline foreign policy directive for Hungary – the emphasis had to be put on 
increasing exports’ and investments’ figures. The ideological component of foreign policy 
was denied by the Prime Minister, according to him, “ideology-oriented foreign policy was 
invented by smart countries for foolish ones” (Orbán 2014 quoted in Ámon and Deák 2015, 
p.87). Similarly, Végh (2015, p.51) argues that, in essence, in 2014 Orbán applied the logic of 
the Eastern Opening to foreign policy as a whole – a new phase of foreign policy put 
economic interests at its core. This logic has found evidence within the framework of Russo-
Hungarian relations in 2015. When the European Union was initiating sanctions against 
Russia as a backfire to the annexation of Crimea, Hungary and Orbán, in particular, criticized 
them as “a shot in our own leg” (Orbán 2014 quoted in Hungary Today 2014). According to 
the Prime Minister, sanctions would hurt Hungary and the European Union more than they 
would hurt Russia. However, Hungary voted in favour of all rounds of sanctions (Végh 2015, 
p.56). Despite this, Orbán managed to demonstrate another rhetoric support to Russia when 
times were tough for it [Russia]. In 2015 when the rest of the EU turned their backs to Putin, 
Hungarian Prime-Minister was the only EU leader who invited Putin for a state visit. In sum, 
the existing research acknowledges that the “Eastern Opening” signified a turnaround in 
Hungary’s policy towards Russia, although it did not achieve the success it was initially 
aiming at. While few works argue that economic interests drive Hungary’s inclination toward 
Russia, trade figures per se do not support this claim. Whereas relations in the energy sector 
can be considered as the key drivers of these bilateral relations. 
1.3. Energy relations 
 The literature on the topic overwhelmingly points to the energy component as the 
determining one in Hungarian-Russian relations, with Hungary being on the vulnerable end 
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due to its dependency on Russian energy supplies (Ámon and Deák 2015; Deák et. al 2015; 
Juhász et. al 2015; Viček 2015; Hegedűs 2016; Deák and Weiner 2019). Végh (2015, p.54) 
assesses 90% of Russian exports to Hungary to be crude oil and gas. The figures on the extent 
of Hungary’s dependency on Russian oil and gas circulate around 90% and 70% respectively. 
Viček (2015, p.141) prescribes import dependency of the Hungarian oil sector solely to 
Russia, whereas regarding the natural gas sector he estimates Hungary’s dependency on 
Russian imports to be around over 60%. Similarly, Hegedűs (2016, p.2) lists the figures of 
89% and 57% for crude oil and natural gas respectively. Hence, looking at these figures, the 
scholarship widely referred to the state of affairs in the energy sector between Hungary and 
Russia as ‘energy dependency’, describing the relations to be not balanced with Hungary 
being on the vulnerable side (Ámon and Deák 2015, p.93). That is why Hegedűs (2016, p.4), 
for example, to some extent advocates Hungary’s recent rapprochement with Russia, claiming 
that “securing a stable and sustainable natural gas supply for a reasonable price and 
developing new markets in Russia for Hungarian exports are fundamental national interests 
that should be pursued by any Hungarian government”. Due to its energy dependency, 
Hungary traditionally supported projects that would be in line with the increase of supply 
diversification, such as Nabucco, South Stream pipelines or regional interconnectors, 
Buzogány (2017, p.1315) argues. Whereas some scholars, in turn, assessed Hungary’s energy 
partnership with Russia as rather cautious. Butler and Ostrowski (2018, p.33) assess Hungary 
as the ‘hesitant partner’ among countries within the region when it comes to energy relations 
with Russia: 
These states recognise the need to work with and partner Russia in terms of 
energy supply, but are wary of completely opening up access to their energy 
sector and will actively oppose Russian investment when not deemed to be in 
their national interest, but will be more willing to explore partnership 
opportunities. 
 
However, the authors observe that Hungary is moving towards another bloc recently – the 
‘collaborator’ one. These countries (primarily Serbia) opened up the energy sector to Russian 
influence and penetration. Hence, although Hungary remains cautious about opening up its 
energy sector to Russia to a larger extent, their collaboration on energy issues remains on a 
relatively high level. In sum, agreeing on the fact that Hungary is dependent on Russian gas 
and oil supplies, the literature has acknowledged that indeed, it would be viable for any 
Hungarian government by pursuing a national interest to secure and stabilize gas supply from 
Russia; as well as to seek diversification of supply routes.  However, more recently, i.e. 
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during Orbán’s second and third terms, the literature has widely referred to the current energy 
relations as to quid pro quo relations or “gas diplomacy”. 
 Several authors have emphasized that the current nature of energy relations between 
Moscow and Budapest have acquired a quid pro quo character – with Hungary seeking to 
secure beneficial deals and Russia expecting political services on the European stage in 
return. Moscow persists to be a dominant energy supplier not only for Hungary but for 
Central Europe as a whole. It has a strong mandate on energy-related issues and shapes 
regional energy relations due to a couple of reasons. Firstly, it remains the cheapest energy 
source, for Hungary included; secondly, “the transition from bilateral LTCs to hub-based, 
high-frequency gas markets is a very long one” (Ámon and Deák 2015, p.90). Hence, 
Hungarian governments sought to secure the stability of gas supply (especially after the 2009 
Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute), to diversify the sources of supply and to keep the domestic gas 
prices relatively low (Deák 2014a, p.1). The latter one has been especially the case for 
Orbán’s government since Fidesz prioritized the social affordability aspect of energy supply. 
In pursuit of electoral victory, Fidesz adhered to so-called ‘populist energy price policies’ – 
they aimed at cutting public utilities’ prices to secure electorate’s support (Ámon and Deák 
2015, p.90; Deák and Weiner 2019; p.5). While between October 2013 and March 2014 the 
wholesaler company was renationalized in Hungary, Moscow used this window of 
opportunity and jumped in with a significant bundle of concessions in LTCs with Gazprom. In 
2013, Fidesz launched a utilities’ price cut which reached around 25% in the following year 
and a half – this was a cornerstone of Orbán’s 2014 electoral campaign which secured him a 
landslide victory (Ámon and Deák 2015, p.90). Such a major price cut would not be possible 
without Russia’s favour. Deák and Weiner (2019, p.5) assess this move as one of the 
strategies of Russian ‘energy statecraft’ where Moscow seeks to “establish a self-supporting 
presence in Hungarian energy and extend it to other fields”.  
 Deák and Weiner (2019) take the assessment of Russian energy statecraft in Hungary 
further by articulating its four distinct features. Firstly, Russia seeks to craft the relations in 
the energy sector in a way for them to contain large-scale and long-term projects pertaining 
high management and corruption risks, such as South Stream, Paks II deal, long-term supply 
contracts that Hungary voluntarily entered into (Deák and Weiner 2019, p. 5). Secondly, on 
the Hungarian side, the gas sector has undergone a major denationalization campaign, making 
the energy companies state-owned enterprises. This, according to the authors, on the one 
hand, improves their international bargaining positions, but on the other hand, paves the way 
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for corruption schemes, patronage and rent-seeking behaviour. Within the framework of 
Russo-Hungarian relations, denationalization has created major information asymmetries 
between the two sides, since Hungary did not have gas sector and sectoral know-how in state 
ownership prior to 2010; with Fidesz’s concept of ‘political governance’ in place, 
nationalization has also “subordinated technocratic and economic considerations to political 
concerns” (Ibid., p.5). Thirdly, Russia-related projects, primarily Paks II deal, have swallowed 
the flow of investments from public funds for years to come, closing the door for alternative 
energy market outcomes (Ibid., p.5). Since the regulatory squeezes drove away investments 
from private investors and companies into the energy field, public funds will be under a huge 
burden due to these projects. The fourth characteristic that the authors bring up has to deal 
with Orbán’s government’s vision of the relations. According to Deák and Weiner (Ibid., p. 
6), the government perceives the quid pro quo nature of the relations as beneficial for 
Hungary, since it is in line with 2014 foreign policy vector that set economic and business 
concerns at the priority of diplomacy. Moreover, the government sees a potential advantage in 
its anti-liberal, Eurosceptic rhetoric – it expects Moscow to be a “strong buyer” of this 
rhetorical non-conformity with the EU and hopes to ‘monetize’ it, i.e. to receive economic 
benefits from the Russian side (Ibid., p.7). These four characteristics of the energy statecraft 
have demonstrated themselves in three projects, according to the authors, - South Stream, 
conveniently timed gas contract concessions and Paks II deal.  
1.4. Paks nuclear plant deal 
 The Paks II deal has been discussed by a great number of authors in the literature - 
while some of the sources give small credit to the deal as to an attempt of energy 
diversification (Weiner 2017), majority of the pieces perceive it as the manifestation of 
Russian influence in Hungary (Deák 2014a; Ámon and Deák 2015; Fazekas et. al 2014; 
Sáfián et. al 2015; Végh 2015; Viček 2015; Hegedűs 2016; Deák and Weiner 2019). Paks 
nuclear power plant has four nuclear reactors that have been functioning since the 1980s, 
today they account for around 50% of electric power produced in Hungary (Deák and Weiner 
2019, p.9). Two of its blocs were to be decommissioned in the early 2030s due to the end of 
their life cycle, and due to their value in the country’s electricity production, the substitution 
of the blocs was of the great importance. Alas, the decision for them to be renewed by 
Russian Rosatom came as a surprise. Ámon and Deák (2015, p.91), Viček (2015, p.146), 
Deák and Weiner (2019, p.10) argue that the decision came out of the blue – in total secrecy, 
without any prior consultation with the experts or public, the Prime-Minister’s office took the 
9 
 
full responsibility for arranging the deal with Russia. Initially, the contract was about to be put 
out for a tender where several foreign companies were about to compete, but eventually, the 
idea of a tender was dropped (Than 2015, p.1). According to the deal, Russia will issue a €10 
billion 30-year-term loan under which Rosatom will construct two new reactors. This is by far 
the largest budget item within the bilateral relations of two countries, accounting for around 
12% of Hungarian GDP (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.10). The government representatives 
praised the deal in the public statements as “deal of the century” and “marriage of 
convenience, which the partners are increasingly enjoying as well” (Lázár 2014 quoted in 
Deák 2014a, p.2). Paks was proclaimed to be the core of future energy management in 
Hungary – the best possible financial deal bringing the cheapest electricity in the future 
(Sáfián et. al 2015, p.4). The detailed analysis of how exactly the deal is beneficial in the 
long-run has not been presented - no detailed costs-and-benefits analysis, no background 
calculations to justify the deal were provided from the government’s side. Moreover, the 
experts’ community does not have a chance to provide a detailed analysis of the project 
because its contents (both past- and future-related) were ruled to be classified to restrict public 
access. This has caused a major discontent within the experts’ community. The decision that 
came as a surprise raised eyebrows not only domestically. The European Commission has 
launched an investigation and an infringement procedure based on several factors of the deal 
– lack of tendering, state aid aspects (80% of the project will be financed by the Russian loan, 
20% - by the Hungarian government) and transparency concerns (Deák and Weiner 2019, 
p.10). However, in 2017 the EC dropped the case (Valero 2017). Entailing many 
controversies, concerns over the deal found the reflection within the academic literature on 
Russia-Hungary relations.  
The scholarship agrees that although aimed at energy diversification and, therefore, 
strengthening energy security, the deal ties Hungary to Russia for years to come, hence, 
increasing dependence on Russia even more; the deal poses more concerns over the potential 
risks than certainty about potential benefits. Over the time since the deal has been signed, an 
extensive literature has developed on the potential risks behind the deal. Végh (2015, p. 61) 
argues that the deal is in direct contradiction with energy diversification strategy since the 
project will be supplied with Russian know-how; instead of decreasing the dependence on 
Russian sources, it only strengthens it. Similarly, a report by Fazekas et. al (2014, p.2) from 
Energiaklub think-tank stipulates that due to the application of new technologies by the 
Russians, major informational asymmetries will evolve throughout the project implementation 
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that the contractor may use to its own benefit. Moreover, according to the authors, the high-
scale nature of the project creates multiple corruption opportunity windows – this kind of 
projects create complex relationship systems, under which there is a higher chance of the 
misuse of the resources by the various subordinates. This is especially the case with the Paks 
deal where the customer and the contractor are two monopolistic agents: “Bilateral 
monopolies based on the participation of two parties generate more opportunities for misuse 
both for the customer and the contractor than standard market contracts” (Ibid., p.2). The 
corruption risk is calculated to be as high as 13-16% of the total investment (Hegedűs 2016, 
p.5). Namely, based on the previous experience of high-scale investment projects like this, 
studies point out that the lack of transparency and public tendering induce bribery and 
blackmailing (Fazekas et. al 2014, p.39). These transactions, eventually, may result in value 
as high as 13-16% of the total investment. Deák back in 2014, assumingly due to the timing of 
the article and, hence, lack of information about the deal, claimed the project to have a certain 
chance of profitability (Deák 2014a, p.2). However, the author also listed several risks. 
Firstly, management risks are to be aware of due to Hungary’s relatively poor record of 
regulation and the corrupted environment. Secondly, according to Deák (2014a, p.2), the 
cabinet expected the electricity prices on the European market to be high in the future but it 
has not provided any analysis quantifying the stance of the price of the electricity to be 
produced by Paks vis-à-vis European electricity price in the mid-2020s. Thirdly, considering 
Hungary’s vulnerable economic performance and potential global financial jumps, the interest 
rate aspect of the deal poses huge risks. In fact, the Hungarian side is already seeking to 
postpone the loan payback until the new reactors start working; meanwhile, construction is 
behind the schedule – it was supposed to start last year (Digges 2019, p.1). In a similar 
manner to Deák (2014a), Weiner (2017) argues that to some extent the Paks deal can be 
interpreted as a diversification attempt since it adds in sectoral diversification. However, it 
simultaneously decreases dependency on Russian gas supplies and increases dependency on 
Russia overall. Considering these risks as articulated by the academics, the expert community 
has even come up with considerable research on the alternatives to Paks. A study by Sáfián 
et.al (2015) from Energiaklub think-tank develops an in-depth analysis providing supportive 
evidence for the viable alternatives to nuclear plant – biomass, wind and solar energy. In sum, 
outlining potential risks, the academic community tends to agree on a highly opaque nature of 
the deal. Being the largest budget item of Russo-Hungarian relations, the scholarship 
perceives the deal as a potential extension of Russian influence in Hungary for years to come, 
which Russia, in turn, may further use to its benefits.  
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1.5. Ideological proximity 
Distancing from economic and energy aspects of bilateral relations, several studies 
analyze Russo-Hungarian rapprochement through the ideological prism. Those conclude that 
even though the ideological proximity between the value systems of current governments in 
Russia and Hungary cannot be denied, it was not the determining factor in driving the recent 
intensification of bilateral relations. Buzogány (2017), for example, applies the theory of 
authoritarian diffusion onto Russo-Hungarian case to test whether it is Putin who inspired 
Orbán’s illiberal rhetoric and policies and whether the stepping onto the rapprochement path 
can be explained by ideological proximity. The author accepts the fact that there is a 
possibility of authoritarian diffusion coming from Russian side since the countries [Russia 
and Hungary] have lots of ideational similarities. Among these he quotes the lack of elite 
change, elite populism, party polarization, patrimonial capitalism, charismatic leadership and 
others (Buzogány 2017, p.1309). However, the author concludes that it was not necessarily 
Russia’s projection of its values and practices that led Hungary to choose this model. Rather, 
the end result stems from this: 
In sum, the sweeping political reforms carried out after 2010 in Hungary do have 
a neoconservative, statist imprint that can be regarded as upholding a paternalist 
populism, which is critical of the institutions and outcomes of liberal democracy. 
Some characteristics of this heterodox worldview are indeed reminiscent of 
Putin’s sovereign democracy, but there is no evidence for seeing them copy-and-
pasted from Russia. As far as we can see, neither was Russia actively seeking to 
promote particular policies in Hungary nor was the Hungarian government 
actively looking for them. Neither Russia nor Hungary seem to follow a clear 
ideology: in Hungary, the neoconservative ideas are rather fluid and 
heterogeneous in a way that does not add up to a clear ideology at all. However, 
there is certainly an overlap both in what Linz has termed “mentalities” and in the 
way self-serving elites in both countries use ideational aspects to veil their 
interests (Ibid., p.1314). 
 
That is, the author concludes that the rise of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary has not been 
imported from Russia. There is just a certain overlap of ‘mentalities’ in the leadership. The 
author argues that is why both Hungary and Russia are criticized for the same stuff by the 
West – democratic deficits. Hence, to some extent, the recent strengthening of ties might be 
“fed by their desire to quench their own international legitimacy deficit through mutual 
recognition” (Ibid., p.1317). Therefore, the author does not fully deny the presence of an 
ideological component in the relationship, however, his assessment demonstrates it not to be 
the determining factor in the recent rapprochement.  
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 Similarly to Buzogány (2017), Hegedűs (2016) agrees that although ideological 
component within the bilateral relations is not negligible, it is not the key driver of the 
strengthening ties. According to Hegedűs (2016, p.3), Orbán’s turn to pro-Russian stance 
takes its roots in “the national freedom fight against the EU”. In this manner, he demonstrated 
more than once his rhetorical admiration for Putin as the strong national leader, standing for 
the protection of ‘traditional’ social values against ‘corrupt’ liberal influences (Ibid.). He 
manifested the ideological proximity to Russia in the infamous speech in Baile Tusnad, where 
he referred to ‘successful nations’ who are not Western liberal, not even liberal and not even 
democracies, listing among them Russia (Orbán 2014). However, this rhetoric, according to 
Hegedűs (2016), has little to do with the actual strengthening of the ties between the 
governments. In contrast, “the strong ties connecting the large-scale Hungarian business 
projects to Russia allow the politically organized Hungarian oligarchy access to significant 
financial gain while giving Moscow an easy tool to control and influence” (Ibid., pp. 6-7). 
That is, for the Hungarian side these are mostly utilitarian considerations that drive the 
inclination toward Russia. For Russia, in turn, Hungarian friendship combined with its 
membership in the EU and NATO is a valuable asset, the author argues. 
1.6. Rapprochement with Russia vis-à-vis EU membership 
 In this regard, several authors have admitted that Hungary’s EU membership is an 
important factor in the context of Russo-Hungarian relations since Hungary often had to 
balance its position between the two, engaging in so-called ‘pendulum politics’. One of such 
obvious cases has to deal with the EU sanctions against Russia. In this scenario, Hungary 
provided the rhetorical support for Russia – it widely criticized sanctions on the European 
arena. However, it did not diverge from the common European position and voted for all the 
rounds of sanctions. Buzogány (2017, p.1309) argues “while Hungarian government provided 
rhetorical support for Russia in cases where its interests were at stake (energy issues, EU 
sanctions), it never left the common Western line but tried to increase its bargaining position 
on both sides”. Similarly, Hegedűs (2016, p.2) admits that since the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict broke out, Hungary managed to balance its position thanks to a ‘peacock dance’ – 
‘two steps forward, one step back’. Namely, it supported both the EU sanctions and NATO 
commitments articulated at Cardiff summit in September of 2014, but it suspended the 
reverse-flow of gas to Ukraine for a couple of months in 2014-2015. In a similar manner, 
Győri (2019, p.4) calls this balancing ‘double-faced diplomacy’. The government and Fidesz 
expressed support for Ukrainian territorial sovereignty and for sanctions against Russia, but 
Orbán himself criticized sanctions while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been 
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blocking Ukraine’s NATO integration due to minority rights dispute (Győri 2019, p.4). 
Moreover, as Buzogány (2017, p.1315) puts it, timing-wise, “a more pronounced rhetorical 
embracement of Russia by Hungary has followed EU criticism of diminishing democracy in 
Hungary”. However, the author simply refers to the ‘time sequences’ without providing any 
further in-depth evidence. In sum, the scholarship agrees that, as Hegedűs (2016, p.3) puts it, 
“Hungary’s official measures balance its obligations to Western alliance structures with a 
pragmatic policy toward Russia”.  
 This brings this literature review to the concluding part. Having established a review 
of key themes within the Russo-Hungarian bilateral relations as discussed by the various 
scholars, this section sums up key arguments that authors used to describe Russo-Hungarian 
relations. Thereby, in an attempt to characterize the recent rapprochement between the 
governments, Conley et.al (2016, p.40) assess Hungary as “willing and vulnerable to Russian 
channels of political and economic influence” and argue that it goes hand-in-hand with 
Orbán’s admiration of illiberal models of governance and strengthening criticism of Western 
policies. Several studies (Deák et. al 2015; Buzogány 2017; Deák and Weiner 2019) argue 
that Hungarian government is driven primarily by economic and utilitarian considerations 
when it comes to strengthening of the ties with Russia. Ámon and Deák (2015, p.87) call it a 
‘business relationship on the political level’. Hegedűs (2016, p.4), in turn, acknowledges that 
Hungarian drive into Russia’s orbit is not that black and white since it is challenging to 
identify a clear distinction between a widely-referred legitimate pursuit of national interest 
and getting corrupted and falling into the patronage of Russian influence. In this regard, 
Solodkyy (2019, p.12) assumes that Moscow is fine with Budapest deviating to some extent 
from a fully pro-Russian course since Hungary alone cannot break NATO and EU policies 
(sanctions, withdrawal from South Stream project, the expulsion of Russian diplomats after 
Skrypal case are some proves); however,  Orbán’s willingness alone is enough to implement 
Russia’s interests at least partially. Several scholars agree that there is a place for the EU’s 
role in Hungary’s rapprochement with Russia. Deák et. al (2015), for instance, recognize that 
the rise of EU scepticism within Hungarian political elites to some extent influences their pro-
Russian policy. Moreover, the lack of concerns about democratic deficits in Russia, and since 
recently even a certain degree of admiration from Orbán’s side regarding the type of 
governance in Russia, fuels the bilateral cooperative tone, according to the authors. When it 
comes to what is it that is driving Russia’s interest in partnership with Hungary, the 
scholarship tends to agree that Hungary is valuable to Russia only as EU and NATO member 
– Russia expects to have Hungary’s back at the European stage to be able to influence the 
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EU’s decision-making and, potentially, to bring in the disruption of unity within (Hegedűs 
2016; Buzogány 2017; Deák and Weiner 2019). Solodkyy (2019) argues Moscow’s interest 
extends further beyond. According to the author, knowing Hungary’s focus on kin policy, 
Russia also seeks to escalate the situation with Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine to de-
stabilize it [Ukraine] even more; it aims at using Hungary’s back in EU and NATO circles so 
that to undermine support for Ukraine and get rid of sanctions against itself; to fuel anti-
liberal sentiments in Hungary (Solodkyy 2019, p. 2).  
 It is fair to conclude the literature review with the following: one part of the 
scholarship is rather cautious with the analysis of the Russo-Hungarian recent governmental 
rapprochement, whereas another one is not afraid to label the relationship as going beyond 
pragmatic utility-driven cooperation. Namely, some authors hesitate to label the recent 
bilateral relations as ‘special’ (as the Western media outlets and analysts do) and to assess 
Russian influence to be excessive. Whereas some other scholars describe the relationship as 
receptive and vulnerable to Russian influence. The main problem with some of the pieces that 
instead of being in-depth studies based on strong methodology, some of them look like 
opinion pieces relying on selective evidence and interpretations. However, the literature 
review as a whole has identified some streamline issues or concepts that are commonly agreed 
across various scholars. In this regard, the authors recognize that there is an energy 
dependency on the Hungarian side and that the Paks deal does not seem to help in reducing 
this dependency. However, the authors consider that overall the rapprochement with Russia 
was in line with ‘Eastern Opening’ foreign policy, and, therefore, in line with the pursuit of 
‘national interest’ as articulated by the government. There is limited evidence for the 
ideological component as the key driver of the intensification of relations. Despite the overlap 
of mentalities (admiration of illiberal practices, in particular), shared values do not drive the 
bilateral cooperation, as according to the studies available. When it comes to the role of the 
EU, the scholars agree that EU scepticism among the Hungarian political elites pushed the 
pro-Russian vector to some extent. However, it was not as strong as to make Hungary deviate 
from the common EU line against Russia and vote against sanctions, for example. These 
themes discussed in the literature help to create a detailed snapshot of the current Russo-
Hungarian relations from certain angles. However, none of them manages to present a 





Chapter 2. Theoretical literature review 
 As the literature review has demonstrated, the majority of the studies look onto the 
relationship through the prisms of the Eastern Opening or dependency in energy relations, 
hence, ending up at limited conclusions that fail to provide a holistic picture of the state of 
relations. Single-handedly these studies provide answers as to what can be considered the 
turning point in the Russo-Hungarian rapprochement (Eastern Opening), what is the major 
cooperation sphere (energy) or what is the largest deal between the two (Paks deal). However, 
none of the studies attempts to explore these aspects of the relationship in a coherent holistic 
picture so that to critically make sense of the relationship. Moreover, a limited number of 
studies utilizes theoretical frameworks in their analyses.  
This paper, instead, will attempt to engage with the theoretical literature to fill in the 
gaps left by the existing scholarship on Russo-Hungarian relations. Namely, employing 
existing theoretical frameworks we will seek an answer for the following research question: 
“What is the cornerstone of Hungary’s close cooperation with Russia?”. The word 
‘cornerstone’ is used in the research question on purpose because it encompasses several 
dimensions to it. Within the context of this study, it implies the key rationale and the key 
factor/driving force that affects the intensification of the relations. Hence, it is possible to 
divide this main research question into the following sub-questions – “what is the key factor 
affecting the intensifying cooperation between Hungary and Russia?” and “what does make 
this relationship to be perceived as particularly close?”. In other words, the research 
objective is to critically evaluate the key driving force behind the current governments’ 
intensified cooperation. 
This research will adopt an inductive approach. Namely, it does not pose any 
hypotheses that it is willing to test. Instead, it sets the research questions as guides to the 
critical exploration. It is expected that through the analysis of the data, the patterns, 
relationships and meanings will be identified that, in turn, will help in reaching some 
conclusions. However, to guide the course of the research, i.e. to structure the research design, 
a theoretical framework will be of help. Instead of crafting its own theoretical framework 
though, this research will review the existing theoretical literature in order to find a 
potentially employable framework.  In other words, a suitable theoretical prism will be 




2.1. Literature on ‘small states’, ‘middle powers’ and ‘great powers’ – where do Hungary 
and Russia fit? 
An interesting avenue for the conceptualization and categorization of states is offered 
by the frameworks of relative size and power. Power is a key concept within the realism 
theory of International Relations. Its [power’s] importance for realism is as huge as units of 
measurement are important for physics. In this manner, power is widely defined in realist 
literature through the possession of material resources or capabilities (Long 2017, p.188). 
These, on a state level, include such indicators as GDP, territory size, military capabilities, 
etc. However, there is more to that. The primary role of power is not the number of material 
resources, but rather the ability to exercise them so that to influence the course of actions of 
other actors. The key realist theorists Morgenthau and Mearsheimer both promote this 
understanding of the concept of power (Ibid.). Hence, based on this logic, the relative 
disparities in power produce categorization and even hierarchy across states. Putting it simply, 
depending on the extent of power a state possesses, or the lack of power, it might be weak, 
strong, or somewhere in-between. The terms weak and strong became interchangeably used 
with ‘small’ and ‘great’ to differentiate between states. Therefore, in the scholarship, a ‘weak 
state’ or ‘small state’ or ‘small power’ would mean the same, and would be opposed to ‘great 
power’. Handel’s (1990) framework on weak, a.k.a. small, and strong states in the 
international system might be of help in shedding some more light on the issue and explaining 
relative power disparities and states’ categorization. According to him, states’ categorization 
is not black and white – i.e. there are not just weak states and strong states. Instead, both 
power and its lack, i.e. weakness, are a continuum identified by a variety of indicators 
(economic, military, etc.) where small states and great powers fall onto. Based on the 
aggregated estimation of power, small states and great states lie towards the opposite ends of 
the continuum. A figure below demonstrates that.  
 
Figure 1. International power hierarchy as a continuum (Handel 1990, p.11). 
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 Using this framework, it would be possible to categorize both Hungary and Russia into 
one of these groups. To support any potential argumentation, there is an existing scholarship 
that attempted to categorize Hungary already. Szalai (2017), for example, tests whether the 
identity of smallness has any effect on Hungarian foreign policy. First of all, Szalai (2017) 
argues that Hungary is a small state according to the following encompassing definition: 
“small states … those entities whose size in terms of territory, population, economic output 
and military capacities are below the average of their region” (Szalai 2017, p.348). Together 
with another subject of his research, Slovakia, the author assesses Hungary to be a small state 
both within the European Economic Area and in its broader neighbourhood, which includes 
candidates and potential EU candidates, Eastern Partnership countries and Russia. Hence, 
within the EU and on a broader neighbourhood level, according to the author, Hungary is a 
small state. However, the main conclusions that the author derives from the research are the 
following – 1) the identity of smallness is almost not present in Hungary’s official strategic 
documentation; 2) the identity of smallness is not affecting Hungary’s current foreign policy. 
Referring to Prime Minister Orbán’s statements, Szalai (2017, p.356) claims the leader 
rejected ‘weakness’ as a guiding principle of the strategy and set the country on a course to 
making Hungary strong through economic means. In sum, Szalai (2017) disproved that 
identity of smallness is either present in Hungary’s foreign policy discourse or influencing it, 
but he categorized Hungary as a small state.  
 However, one may disagree with this categorization and call Hungary a ‘middle 
power’ instead. Szalai’s assessment omits such important factors as Hungary’s NATO and 
EU membership that potentially add strength to the members in military and economic terms. 
Namely, under NATO’s article no. 5 regulation, allies have a right to join in military combat 
to protect an ally if it is attacked. Or, in the case of the EU, in economic and financial terms, 
an EU member is not on its own as well. In times of financial difficulties, the member states 
may count on EU bodies’ support, in the form of grants, loans or some benefit packages. That 
is, the economic power of a member of this regional organization cannot be measured per se. 
Its economic power is potentially enhanced through the membership of the EU. Hence, even 
on the level of the neighbourhood, that Szalai is using, membership in NATO and the EU 
adds greater potential power that the members might use. Therefore, one would be right to 
admit that depending on the level of measurement and when compared to the outsiders of the 
EU and NATO, Hungary might be categorized not as a ‘small state’ but rather as a ‘middle 
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power’. It would be right to conclude that Hungary’s categorization can be shifted along the 
continuum. 
 However, since we are trying to categorize both Hungary and Russia, it would be fair 
to juxtapose the two to fix the categorizations. Russia is commonly agreed to be categorized 
as a ‘great power’. This categorization has been especially applicable to the USSR back in the 
Cold War times when the bilateral competition with another ‘superpower’, the US, was 
defining the world power politics. Due to the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s ‘superpower’ 
status has become a thing of the past. However, its ‘great power’ status holds after it. Its 
possession of the vast amounts of natural resources, the world’s largest territory and huge 
military capabilities add a lot to its relative power. Moreover, when put on a continuum or in 
comparison with lesser states, be it ‘middle powers’ or ‘small states’, Russia’s ‘great power’ 
status remains salient. Therefore, when compared to Hungary, it is not as important whether 
Hungary’s status is one of a ‘small state’ or a ‘middle power’. The disparity between the two 
[Russia and Hungary] is key. Similarly, (Rostoks 2010, p.87) argues “relational power or, to 
be more precise, relational weakness is the main characteristic of small states”, meaning 
asymmetry vis-à-vis more powerful states is key in categorizing small states. One would be 
right to contest this categorization for both of the countries and argue that both of them can be 
shifted along the continuum depending on factors considered or the level of measurement. 
However, these small margins along which both Russia and Hungary can be shifted become 
almost unimportant when two countries are juxtaposed against each other. Therefore, it would 
be analytically valuable to look at the relationship between Hungary and Russia as the one 
between a ‘small state’ and a ‘great power’.  
2.2. ‘Small states’ and ‘great powers’: potential explanations 
The theoretical conceptualizations of relations between small states and great powers 
are numerous. Realism would argue that small states following the calculations of relative 
power between them and great powers, could potentially bandwagon with great powers, 
meaning ally with them if threatened. This, according to various explanations, might happen 
to avoid an attack of a great power later on or to receive the share of spoils of victory from a 
great power (Walt 1985), for example. Schweller (1998), in turn, argues a small state is driven 
to bandwagon with a great power mostly by profit considerations, as well the wave of the 
future, anticipating the great power to be the leading power in the foreseen future. However, 
both Walt’s and Scheweller’s explanations are not valid ones in the case of Hungary. Both of 
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the works are heavily influenced by World War II and Cold War contexts when the world was 
split into military camps and relative power calculations were a key driving factor behind 
foreign policy orientation. Even though Schweller’s argumentation on profit and ‘wave of the 
future’ considerations dominating small states’ logic might resonate with Hungary’s foreign 
policy, does not apply to modern-day Hungary. Namely, it can explain some motivations for 
Hungary’s intensified cooperation with Russia, like Hungary’s ‘interest-driven’ foreign policy 
or it could potentially correlate with Orbán’s admiration of illiberal types of governance and 
Russia in particular and him putting sakes on them as future economic leaders. However, the 
key assumption of realism that a small state would seek an alliance with great power is not 
valid here. Indeed, bandwagoning implies military aligning with a great power, which 
Hungary is not willing to do with Russia – its NATO and EU membership is solidified in its 
security and foreign policy strategies. It would be a different case scenario if Hungary was not 
in the EU and NATO. Although in theory, Hungary could have opted for military neutrality 
during the transition times, it did not do so. Together with other Central European neighbours, 
Hungary chose the Western military alliance so that to distance itself from the former ‘big 
brother’, Russia. In sum, realism and its branches can shed a light on Hungary’s recent 
intensification of relations with Russia only partially. It can explain some of its motivations, 
but it fails to explain why having secured its military alliance with one camp (NATO), it 
might still seek to engage with another strong power. Traditional realist explanations are 
outdated to be applied to the Russo-Hungarian case – they put emphasis primarily on relative 
power calculations as a guiding principle of small states’ logic and their desire to achieve a 
military alliance with a strong entity as an end-goal.  
Long (2017), in contrast, approaches the study of small states by looking at the various 
sources of power the small states might seek to employ. Among them he lists collective 
(through building coalitions), particular-intrinsic (through the exercise of available resources) 
and derivative (through a relationship with a great power) types of power. Derivative power, 
according to Long (2017, p.196), is acquired by the small states “by convincing larger states 
to take actions that boost their interests”. In this regard, Hungary’s rapprochement with 
Russia might be seen as part of the desire to derive power from a great power, such as through 
beneficial energy deals or through advancing trade. Namely, via advancing trade and securing 
energy deals, it seeks to achieve greater material advantage and, hence, greater power. While 
this conceptualization might be applicable, the explanations it would provide would be partial. 
Namely, it provides only a one-sided explanation for why a small state might want to engage 
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with a great power. It does not give answers on why a great power might intensely cooperate 
with a small state. Therefore, both the traditional realist concepts of ‘bandwagoning’ 
described earlier or Long’s ‘derivative power’ might shed just some light onto the motivations 
behind the intensification of Russo-Hungarian relations. A more comprehensive theory is 
needed. 
2.3. Patron-client theory: the origins 
 Patron-client types of relationship are a subject of discussion in the literature not only 
on international relations but also on domestic politics and sociology. The concepts of 
patronage and cliency take their roots in social and cultural anthropology. Their usage later 
had a spillover into comparative politics where the academia uses the concepts to analyze the 
patronage patterns in states domestically, as well as into the studies of interstate relations. In 
his study of patron-client politics in Southeast Asia Scott (1972) defined the relationship as: 
…dyadic ties involving … instrumental friendship in which an individual of 
higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to 
provide protection and benefits … for a person of lower status (client) who … 
reciprocates by offering general support and assistance including personal 
services, to the patron (Scott 1972, p.92). 
In this framework, i.e. in a domestic political context, the patron-client relationship has been 
identified as a dyadic mutually beneficial exchange between the actors with a major status 
asymmetry. The inquiries into such connections on the domestic level are numerous in 
literature. The term has later evolved to be referred to in such studies as ‘clientelism’ (Scott 
1972; Hicken 2011). Therefore, ‘clientelism’ should not be interchangeably used with 
‘international patron-client relationship’ term. The former one refers to the dyadic tie between 
the patron and the client within the domestic context. The application of the patron-client 
relationship framework to the interstate relations though has not been witnessed until the 
1980s. Shoemaker and Spanier’s (1984) and Carney’s (1989) frameworks are the very few 
developed in the field so far. Shoemaker and Spanier were pioneers who developed a 
theoretical framework of patron-client relationship applied onto the international level.  
2.3.1. Patron-client relationship: Shoemaker and Spanier’s framework 
 Shoemaker and Spanier’s contribution to the research on international patron-client 
relationships is one of a few available. The authors kick-start their exploration of patron-client 
relationship in-between states assuming that security is the main concern driving such 
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association where security transfers between the actors are especially salient (Shoemaker and 
Spanier 1984, p.14). That is, patron-client relationship, in the authors’ understanding, is 
primarily about security transfers, not economic ones. That is why they, and scholars of the 
field later, argue that research on patron-client associations occupies a separate niche, 
different from dependency theory.  
 According to the authors, the patron-client relationship based on security transfers is 
mutually beneficial. The patron is receiving the quid pro quo favours from the client, whereas 
the client can achieve a higher level of security thanks to the patron’s transfers. Due to the 
nature of the relationship, i.e. it being not a legalized military alliance, this kind of partnership 
has its distinct characteristics. In this manner, Shoemaker and Spanier (1984) were the first 
ones to address the previous research by arguing that in fact, a patron-client relationship is not 
rigid. According to the authors (1984, p.16), the partnership instead is “fuzzy, fluid and 
fluctuating, subject to constant change and only sharply defined in the context of a crisis”. 
Based on this, the authors develop a set of dominant features that patron-client association is 
characterized by.  
 Shoemaker and Spanier (1984) articulate three distinct characteristics of a patron-
client relationship. Firstly, they argue, a major asymmetry in military capabilities is present in 
these relations. This makes the security transfers flow unidimensional – from a patron to the 
client (Ibid., p.13). Secondly, in such a relationship the client plays a crucial role in the 
patron’s relative advantage against its competitors. The authors assess this factor as the one 
keeping the parties interested in a bond – the greater advantage the patron gets from the 
association with the client, the more interested he is to keep that bond consistent and the more 
leverage, accordingly, the client gets over the patron. Thirdly, the authors argue there has to 
be a critical ‘perception’ element to a patron-client relationship (Ibid.). Namely, from the 
external point of view, the relationship has to be perceived as strong and consistent, 
manifested through, for example, regular meetings of the actors. Moving beyond the general 
characteristics of the relationship, the authors also outline the goals that drive both the patron 
and the client into such associations. 
 The patron, the authors argue, is driven by three considerations – ideological 
convergence, international solidarity and strategic advantage. In this manner, the patron might 
seek the client’s adoption of the patron’s very own ideological system so that to signify its 
superiority to the adversaries (Ibid., p.18). The international solidarity which patron might 
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desire is manifested through the client’s supportive rhetoric of the patron’s policies on the 
international arena, including the alignment of voting at the UN. Strategic advantage, in turn, 
pertains to the patron’s access to the client’s resources, territory, for example, that can 
facilitate the promotion of the patron’s strategic interests. In traditional security terms, an 
example of this would be the establishment of the patron’s military bases on the client’s 
territory. The client’s goals, as was argued earlier, are primarily identified by his security 
concerns. Namely, at the lower threat levels the client will be far more difficult to manage for 
the patron; and vice versa, the higher the security threat level for the client, the higher chance 
for the patron that his demands will be met on the client’s side (Ibid., p.22).  
 Based on these assumptions, and the extent to which either client or patron can gain 
control over another, Shoemaker and Spanier develop a typology of patron-client relationship, 
claiming there can be six variations of this relationship depending on the factors considered: 
patron-centric, patron-prevalence, influence parity, patron and client indifference, client 
prevalence and client-centric (Ibid., p.23). They further apply this framework onto the Cold 
War context – the relationships between superpowers and Third World countries back then.  
 In sum, Shoemaker and Spanier’s framework takes into consideration important 
factors that might be driving actors into a patron-client relationship, but it is extensively 
shaped and framed by the Cold War context in which the work was produced. On the one 
hand, the authors move beyond traditional realist assumptions, such as that all actors at all 
times are focused on power maximization, and they further consider international hierarchy 
structure in their strategic calculations. On the other hand, this contribution might have been 
notable back in the 1980s but not in the modern context. Namely, the authors’ primary focus 
on traditional security concerns is outdated. In the modern international structure, the ultimate 
goal of the small states or middle powers is not survival anymore. Many of them, including 
ex-Communist block countries, chose Western military alliances, such as NATO. While some 
of the traditional security threats might still be actual for them, such as regional conflicts, 
imperial inclinations of great powers (Russia’s proxy wars in the Eurasian region, for 
example), the military survival in its pure sense is off the table for them thanks to their NATO 
membership. This includes Hungary - even though some security threats are present for it, 
considering its geographical location, article number five of the NATO treaty guarantees the 
allies’ military support in case Hungary is attacked by the adversary. In other words, 
Shoemaker and Spanier’s version of the theory in its pure form is probably too simplistic to 
account for the modern-day realities. 
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2.3.2. Patron-client relationship: Carney’s framework 
Carney’s (1989) contribution to the exploration of patron-client relationship is 
influenced largely by Shoemaker and Spanier’s one and develops it further in terms of 
characterization. Carney (1989, p.44) widely defines a patron-client relationship as 
“particularized and reciprocal relationship between two actors controlling unequal resources” 
where “the relationship is not viewed as a zero-sum game by any party”. However, Carney 
takes his development of the theory beyond this definition, outlining criteria for a patron-
client relationship, as well as motivations to enter in such a relationship for both parties. 
 According to the author, there are four generic criteria or elements through which it is 
possible to categorize a relationship between two states as a patron-client one. The first 
element of a client-patron relationship is asymmetry. In this regard, patron and client have 
unequal resources, be it military or economic. The asymmetry is especially salient in the 
relationship between a great power and a less-developed country. Secondly, a patron-client tie 
is characterized by reciprocity. Namely, the relationship has to be two-sided to satisfy the 
criterion of reciprocity where each side can provide to the other one some tangible or non-
tangible benefits. Carney (1989, p.45) calls it “the dyad give and take”. The third element is 
rather vaguely defined at first but is followed up by Carney later on – affectivity. The author 
claims that beyond being purely driven by benefits there has to be a certain degree of affinity 
or loyalty towards the patron coming from the client. The affectivity is intensified with the 
greater difference of status between the countries, hence, goes hand-in-hand with asymmetry. 
Referring to Lemarchand and Legg (1972), Carney (1989, p.45) argues that relationship gets 
more stable with asymmetry rising, and vice versa, the closer the actors get to equality of 
resources, the weaker the affectivity is. Lastly, Carney (1989) considers compliance as the 
key indicator of a patron-client relationship. Putting it simply, the patron would expect the 
client to comply with the crucial matters of its interest, be it voting in the international 
organizations or support for the patron’s projects. The aligning of the voting with patron’s 
request in international organizations like UN, for example, would be a ‘litmus test’ for the 
compliance. Additionally, there are other ways in which a client’s compliance may take place. 
One of those is the client’s relationship with the patron’s main enemy. The greater the degree 
of compliance is, the more conflictual the relationship of the client with that enemy would be 
(Ibid., p.52). The client’s stance toward this actor might range from rhetorical disapproval of 
patron’s adversary to tangible conflictual policies. In this and other types of compliance, it 
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becomes clear that compliance is not that black and white. Carney (1989, p.45) perceives the 
client’s degree of compliance along the continuum:  
Client behaviour can be thought of as existing along a continuum running from 
compliant to non-compliant. Between these two ends lie the degrees of 
compliance. Depending upon the issue, client behaviour can fall anywhere along 
the line. The higher the degree of compliance, the stronger the relationship. Yet, 
as one may expect, clients cannot always comply with patronal wishes. Instances 
of non-compliance are not necessarily problematic, provided that they occur 
infrequently and that the issue in question is not crucial to patronal interests. At 
any rate, a critical feature of client-patron relationships is client compliance. 
 
Therefore, Carney (1989) assesses compliance to be the key indicator of the patron-client type 
of relationship, but he acknowledges that client’s behaviour might vary from compliant to 
non-compliant along the continuum at different times depending on the matter and 
circumstances.  
 Beyond the general characteristics of the patron-client relationship, Carney also 
articulates the factors, or motivations, that drive the actors to enter in such kind of 
relationship. On the client’s side, the author lists three such factors. First, a small power might 
want to engage in a patron-client relationship with great power so that to enhance its position 
and status vis-à-vis other actors, be it regional neighbours or international third parties. 
Among the examples US-Pakistani, US-South Korean, Soviet-Ethiopian relations back in the 
1980s are listed. Second, a client might be driven by a desire to alleviate its material 
deficiencies thanks to the relationship with a patron. Most importantly, this becomes crucial in 
the domestic context of a client. Namely, by distributing the received material benefits from 
the patron among the population fairly, the client may enhance its domestic support and 
legitimacy (Ibid., p.48). That is, the client’s government’s domestic ratings, as well as the 
perception of its association with the patron, might improve if the public receives a share of 
the material transfers from the client. In contrast, if the client fails at fairly distributing the 
benefits among the population, it might suffer from domestic audience costs. In this case, 
even protests and unrest might follow, Carney argues. The examples that the author 
demonstrates are “Iran under Shah, the Philippines under Marcos, Nicaragua under Samoza, 
Cuba under Batista” – in these cases US’ patronal support for these client regimes has 
resulted in a diplomatic embarrassment since the corrupted regimes failed to fairly distribute 
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the material transfers among the population and caused social unrest (Ibid.). Third, a client 
might be attracted to a patron as to a ‘friend’ to associate within a ‘harsh international 
environment’ (Ibid.). Giving the vulnerability of small states, the instabilities in the political 
economy field, having a great power ‘friend’ to rely on for support in difficult times becomes 
a rational choice. In this case, the author lists the examples of the less developed countries for 
whom having an economically successful partner was a ‘buffer’ to rely on in the economic 
downtimes. Overall, the client is primarily driven toward the patron by material 
considerations to improve domestic welfare situation and its own domestic stance, as well as 
to have diplomatic support against potential adversaries or in case of international system 
instabilities.  
 In comparison to the client, the patron does not need material goods in return - his 
expectations are intangible returns. To articulate patron’s motivations, Carney (1989) borrows 
a framework from Shoemaker and Spanier (1984) claiming patron’s motivations have three 
goals. Firstly, a patron might seek ideological convergence from the client’s side. It can even 
put the aligning ideology as a prerequisite for the provision of certain benefits. For example, 
the US under the Jackson-Vanik amendment put the improvement of human rights as a 
precondition for trade. Theoretically, the client’s noncompliance with ideological demands of 
the patron does not always destroy the relationship, unless a patron makes the ideological 
convergence an inflexible prerequisite. Secondly, a patron might seek client’s solidarity. 
Carney (1989, p.50) argues it might take several forms: “treaty obligations, visits by heads of 
states, the convergence of United Nations voting, and international pronouncements of client 
support for the patron, especially in the face of international controversy”. An example is how 
smaller client states supported the US-led boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games (Ibid.). In sum, 
it might vary from some rhetorical support on the international arena to binding deals such as 
the signing of the treaties. Thirdly, as assessed by the author, the potential strategic advantage 
that the patron might gain from the client is the most important factor that drives patron. 
Either through or with a client, a patron seeks to control territories or resources that it deems 
crucial for its strategic goals. A manifestation of this would be the usage of client’s territory 
for deploying its military capabilities there by the patron. Alternatively, a patron might use the 
client as a ‘surrogate’ in a regional conflict instead of engaging in it by itself (Ibid., p.51), as, 
for example, USSR used Cuban, East German and North Korean troops in the African civil 
wars. That is, in contrast to material tangible benefits driving the client, the patron is driven 
26 
 
by nontangible motivations such as solidarity and ideological convergence, as well as by 
potential usage of client’s territory to advance its goals.  
 Apart from clearly articulated criteria of patron-client relationship and motivations that 
drive the actors to enter into it, Carney also provides some indicators that might help 
analytically in spotting a patron-client relationship. He argues that such a relationship would 
be characterized by decency of military and/or economic and/or cultural linkages. Military 
links can take a form of alliances, treaty pacts, military aid or direct military presence (Ibid., 
p.52). Economic ones can be manifested in many ways – from intensive exports and imports 
to loans, grants, access to market and technology. Cultural linkages can be identified through 
student exchanges, flows of tourists and reliance by the client on the patron’s information or 
media. Among these, the author points to the importance of economic linkage. He claims if 
the client’s heavy reliance on certain ‘goods’ from one single partner is spotted, it is a fair 
‘red flag’ for the presence of a patron-client relationship.  Moreover, in a client-patron 
relationship, the patron often performs a role of a “guarantor” to the client, providing, in some 
sense, to its security, be it physical or economic (Liska 1978 quoted in Carney 1989, p.47). 
Nevertheless, despite these seemingly easy-to-detect indicators of client-patron relationship, 
Carney, similarly to Shoemaker and Spanier, concludes that most of the times it is rather fluid 
and vague. It is often fluctuating, changing and gets sharply defined only in a critical moment 
(Ibid., p.47).  
 In sum, Carney has managed to develop a more extensive framework of a patron-client 
relationship, including not only security dimensions of the relationship but the economic ones 
as well. He went beyond a simplistic understanding of the client’s motivations, as well as 
articulated four characteristics of the relationship. However, this extensive elaboration not 
necessarily added the analytical value to the framework’s potential implementation. While the 
actors’ motivations are articulated rather clearly, the four characteristics seem to require 
greater precision. He did not elaborate enough on which of the aspects of the relationship – 
military or economic ones – should be considered as the cornerstone of the patron-client 
relationship. In this logic, probably Shoemaker and Spanier’s focus only on security 
considerations was more analytically fruitful. Moreover, it is unclear what is the analytical 
value of the military, economic and cultural linkages described in the paragraph above. The 
author does not provide guidance on whether the testing for a patron-client relationship 
should be implemented along with them [linkages] as parameters, or should they rather serve 
as a pre-test for further analysis of the characteristics (asymmetry, affinity, reciprocity and 
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compliance). As a result, Carney’s framework, trying to encompass too many factors, ended 
up providing sporadic analytical tools with little explanation about which one of them are 
primary and which are auxiliary.  
2.3.3. Is patron-client theory applicable to the Hungary-Russia case? 
 Both Shoemaker and Spanier’s and Carney’s frameworks on patron-client relations are 
heavily influenced by the Cold Wat context. The authors relied heavily on realism and 
realpolitik assumptions about international relations. Namely, in the prism of these studies, 
the main goal of small states is survival. Hence, they sought affiliation with stronger power, 
i.e. patrons. Moreover, the snapshot of patron-client nexus was rather simplistic back in the 
Cold War times. Strictly speaking, there were two major patrons to choose – USSR and US. 
Hence, the clients could easily derive their leverage from defecting to switch the side (Kosto 
and Blakkisrud 2017, p.506). Even though Shoemaker and Spanier managed to move beyond 
assuming the military alliance as a sole possible kind of affiliation between greater and 
smaller powers by offering patron-client theory – it is less often applicable in the modern 
international arena. To be more precise, the version of the theory in which both Carney and 
Shoemaker and Spanier offer it does not provide a valid framework to be applied to the 
modern-day cases. This also includes modern Russo-Hungarian relations. 
 Shoemaker and Spanier’s extensive focus on security nexus of the relations, for 
instance, is not potentially useful to explain current Russia-Hungary relations. The relations 
between the two in traditional security aspect do not have any potential for transfers and even 
more so for the establishment of patron-client relationship. The two belong to two different 
military blocks. Hungary’s NATO membership, as it was mentioned earlier, is solidified in 
the National Security Strategy. Hence, there is no room for manoeuvring and engaging in the 
traditional security field with Russia. Orbán himself highlights this fact in the speeches at 
bilateral meetings with Putin: “Russia and Hungary move in two different spheres when it 
comes to geopolitical issues” (Orbán 2017). However, according to Orbán (2018) himself, 
this does not cancel out the opportunities for cooperation in other spheres: “While we belong 
to different military alliances, we both have an interest in maximising our successes” 
(mindketten a sikereink maximálásában vagyunk érdekeltek). That is, Shoemaker and 
Spanier’s framework in its pure form cannot be applied to the Russo-Hungarian case. 
Carney’s framework, in turn, as it was argued earlier above, does not clarify any particular 
sphere that should be the analytical nexus for patron-client relations. The author suggests 
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incorporating into analysis various aspects of relations – from military to economic and 
cultural. Therefore, sticking to Carney’s framework, which in part is borrowed from Spanier 
and Shoemaker, would also be unreasonable if one wishes to produce valid arguments about 
Russo-Hungarian relations. Hence, an alternative modification of these interpretations of the 
theory would be an option. 
 However, a search of such in the later literature on the topic does not bring any fruitful 
results. The literature on patron-client relations, as it was mentioned earlier, has further 
evolved but focused since then solely on domestic contexts with clientelism being the primary 
term used. The international dimension of these relations did not witness coverage in the 
literature after Shoemaker and Spanier’s and Carney’s works saw light. The very few recent 
works that try to implement the framework onto case studies agree on the “death of 
scholarship” (Zaman 2015, p.17) and the concentration of the theoretical literature solely on 
the Cold War context (Kosto and Blakkisrud 2017, p.506). Moreover, even looking at the two 
available frameworks by Carney and Spanier and Shoemaker, it can be noted that the 
conceptual clarity has not been reached. While Shoemaker and Spanier offer security-centred 
approach, Carney, although partly borrowing some assumptions from them, broadens the 
spectrum to all the aspects of bilateral relations – military, economic and even cultural. 
Therefore, an altered version of the theory applied to a modern-days case would be a major 













Chapter 3. Research design and methodology 
 Having established a review of potential theoretical frameworks to be employed, this 
chapter will develop a refined version of patron-client theory to be applied onto the Russo-
Hungarian case. It will introduce the research design through which the framework will be 
applied and the methods to be used for data selection and processing.  
3.1. What is wrong with patron-client theory and how to refine it to re-apply onto Russo-
Hungarian case? 
 As the previous chapter has demonstrated, there are several limitations in the patron-
client theory as articulated by the scholars of the field. Namely, there are key things that are 
the modern realities and that do not allow for the mimicking of the framework in the Russo-
Hungarian case. It is, first of all, Hungary’s EU and NATO membership. One cannot assume 
Hungary’s cooperation with Russia in the traditional security field. Hence, this cancels out the 
applicability of Shoemaker and Spanier’s framework in its pure form. Second, although 
power and resources disparity between Hungary and Russia might come across as undeniable 
at a first glance, one may disagree with this argumentation providing a deeper analysis. One 
can argue Hungary’s EU and NATO membership in itself is a major resource which balances 
back the disparity and adds extra credit to Hungary’s side, hence, making Hungary and Russia 
not that unequal of the partners. In this logic, one would be fair to argue that patron and client 
terminology is not applicable even potentially to Russia and Hungary respectively. Hungary is 
not a helpless third-world small-state seeking for an almighty superpower patron to guarantee 
its survival, as Carney and Shoemaker and Spanier suggest clients should be. Lastly, as in 
Carney’s framework, the client’s compliance is the main indicator of a patron-client 
relationship, one could argue it would never be a component of Russia-Hungary relations. 
This would never take place since Hungary’s EU and NATO membership would hurdle any 
potential compliance that would go beyond the rhetoric support.  
 However, the alteration of the focus solely on the energy component of Russo-
Hungarian relations would make the application of the patron-client framework possible. 
Zooming in into energy relations between Russia and Hungary, the patron and client 
terminology does not sound like an exaggeration anymore. It allows addressing the limitations 
due to which the patron-client theory would otherwise be inapplicable to the Russia-Hungary 
case. Firstly, the disparity of resources and power that was not as obvious on the general level 
comes in as striking on the level of energy analysis. As it was demonstrated by the literature 
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review, Hungary heavily depends on energy imports from Russia. Therefore, this energy 
dependence is a hard pro- for the application of patron-client relationship theory, since 
inequality in power and resources is one of its key elements. Secondly, as argued by 
Shoemaker and Spanier, security has to be of a concern for the client for him to enter into a 
relationship with the patron. The traditional understanding of security and insecurity is off the 
table for Hungary as NATO’s member, but the issue of energy security is not. Energy 
security, or rather its lack, to which the scholars often refer to as insecurity, is of paramount 
importance for Hungary. Insecurity is defined as “a situation in which vulnerability from a 
particular danger or threat is perceived to exist” (Butler 2015, p.1). The literature review has 
demonstrated that certain factors are perceived by Hungary to be potential threats to its energy 
sector – such as lack of diversification across supply sources and supply routes that might 
result in potential supply disruptions. With natural gas making up a third (33%) of Hungary’s 
energy use (Butler 2018, p.157), the insecurity of natural gas supplies is particularly troubling 
for the current government. It will be the purpose of this research to establish whether, and if 
yes, how strong, security energy concerns are reflected in the government’s strategic 
documentation and, most importantly, how does it spill over into the energy relations with 
Russia. However, at this point, the literature review did establish that the energy tie is the 
most salient within the Russo-Hungarian bond. Hence, it would make sense to dive in deeper 
into its exploration. In this regard, the application of the patron-client framework to untangle 
the energy relationship will be helpful.  
Namely, without giving away any answers at this point, the Russo-Hungarian energy 
tie looks slightly confusing. On the one hand, Hungary’s unidimensional dependence on gas 
supplies poses huge risks for Hungary. This has demonstrated itself during the 2006 and 2009 
gas crises when the transit of gas has been disrupted by Ukraine. This served as a litmus test 
for Hungary’s gas supply insecurity – not only it depends on a sole supplier – Russia, but also 
the routes of supply are limited. Hence, due to these events, it would make sense to seek ways 
out of this unidimensional dependence. On the other hand, Hungary tries to secure a stable 
supply from Russia on beneficial terms and conditions in the interim. This ambiguity needs to 
be clarified. 
 In sum, focusing on energy transfers component of the relations between Hungary and 
Russia allows addressing the limitations due to which the framework of the patron-client 
relationship would otherwise be inapplicable. The key patron-client characteristics as 
articulated by the various authors reviewed in the theoretical chapter, including inequality, 
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and a mutually beneficial exchange which allows the client to increase its security, are there. 
They manifest themselves in Hungary’s energy imports dependence on Russia itself. 
However, a detailed analysis using a refined patron-client framework is needed. 
3.2. Refined patron-client theory 
 Drawing upon the existing works in the field, and keeping in mind the drawbacks and 
limitations of those, as well as the energy security context of Russia-Hungary relations, this 
paper presents the author’s revised version of the patron-client relationship framework. I will 
keep the hardcore assumptions of the theory and drop off those that do not apply to the Russo-
Hungarian case. Moreover, Shoemaker and Spanier’s and Carney’s frameworks together 
outline a huge amount of characteristics and assumptions. Hence, it is necessary to refine 
them into a coherent set applicable to Hungary-Russia case. 
 Security concern 
I will stick with Shoemaker and Spanier’s suggestion that there should be a certain degree 
of security concern for a client to get closer with the patron. In comparison to other potential 
theoretical explanations, Shoemaker and Spanier’s one is the only one that goes in-depth and 
provides this background condition, or control variable, so to say, to explain the motivation 
behind the client’s close engagement with the patron. Moreover, the literature review on the 
Russo-Hungarian relations has indicated that energy security concerns are of paramount 
importance for Hungary at the moment both on a general level and within the framework of 
bilateral relations with Russia. Therefore, a further investigation into Hungary’s perception of 
its energy security can indicate potentially valuable explanations for why it got closer with 
Russia. Similarly to the theoretical framework of Shoemaker and Spanier, I will consider 
security concern as a background condition, or a pre-text, for the formation of a patron-client 
tie. However, I will drop the authors’ focus solely on traditional security and will switch it to 
the energy security sector. Hence, in my framework, there is a necessity for the assessment of 
the perception of the energy (in)security by the client. 
 Inequality 
Keeping up with the traditional assumptions of the theory, I will retain the ‘inequality’ 
element. As articulated by Shoemaker and Spanier and Carney, the patron-client relationship 
must be characterized by an asymmetry of resources and, therefore, a power disparity between 
the two. Similarly, in my framework, I will also seek to highlight that patron and client can be 
32 
 
identified via their disparity, or asymmetry, of power and resources. However, contrary to the 
traditional assumptions of the existing framework, I will move beyond their traditional 
understanding of power as military and economic capacities. Since the focus of my 
framework is energy relations, the key indicators for my assessment of power will be the 
possession of natural resources like oil and gas, and the extent of the energy dependence of 
the client on the patron. 
 Reciprocity 
I will also retain one of the key patron-client theory assumptions that the reciprocal and 
mutually beneficial “exchange of goods and services … that cannot be obtained … from other 
sources” (Zaman 2015, p.18) is the foundation of the patron-client relationship. However, I 
will move beyond Shoemaker and Spanier’s focus on security transfers only, or from 
Carney’s coverage of all the various kinds of transfers, like economic aid, loans, grants, 
technical advice and indirect transfers. Instead, I will approach the analysis of reciprocity 
through the identification of mutually beneficial energy deals, including pipeline projects, gas 
deals or loans in the energy field. 
 Proximity 
Finally, the works on patron-client relations refer to the perception of proximity as one of 
the key elements in one way or another. Shoemaker and Spanier (1984, p.13) call it a ‘critical 
perception’ of closeness, whereas Carney (1989, p. 44) refers to it as ‘affectivity’. My 
definition of proximity would be manifested through non-tangible, constructivist elements, 
such as regular visits and meetings of the heads of states, rhetorical support on the 
international arena, speech acts highlighting shared values, interests, goals, trust and respect. 
In other words, in my framework proximity will be defined through a set of conceptual 
figures of speech that create the perception of the closeness between the actors for outsiders. 
 In sum, my framework borrows key assumptions of the original theory without 
infringing upon its core but refines them to fit the modern-day realities and the particular case. 
Namely, going back to the initial research questions, the following can be achieved thanks to 
the application of the patron-client theory in the proposed way. Firstly, exploring the energy 
(in)security perception will potentially explain the motivations that drive the client into the 
patron’s orbit, i.e. it will give the insights into the driving force or key factor affecting and 
pushing the Russo-Hungarian relationship. The analysis of ‘inequality’ (asymmetry) and 
‘reciprocity’ features will be a demonstration of what the relationship actually comes down to 
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on practice. In other words, the analysis of these will help critically explore the cornerstone 
of the relationship. Whereas the ‘proximity’ analysis will display the conceptual, or 
constructivist element of the relationship. In other words, it will help in exploring another 
research question, what makes the relationship to be perceived as particularly close. As a 
result, this particular configuration of the analysis, potentially, will be able to give clear, 
unbiased and structured answers as to what the real foundation of the current Russo-
Hungarian relations is. 
 It would be a fair point to raise why narrowing down the application of the theory 
solely to the energy field and not to the economic one as a whole (to count in trade, e.g.), or to 
include the cultural linkages as well. The reason for this has been reflected earlier in the 
literature review. Even though initially the Orbán’s second cabinet’s rapprochement with 
Russia was initiated as part of the ‘Eastern Opening’ to boost trade with non-Western 
countries, as literature review has demonstrated, it did not end up where it was supposed to. 
Commonly agreed as ending in a failure, the policy leaves current trade figures (excluding 
energy trade), at least with Russia, on a non-significant level. Hence, it would be unfruitful to 
focus on the non-energy component of the trade relations, since it is minor. In contrast, the 
literature review proved the energy resources to be a rather salient part of bilateral trade 
relations with major transfers taking place there. Majority of scholars agree on the fact that 
Paks deal is the major transfer in the bilateral relations so far, and the gas deals and 
cooperation on pipeline projects constitute the most important bilateral exchange. Therefore, 
focusing the analysis on the energy field is a valid and reasonable approach.  
3.3. Research design and methodology 
Having formed the theoretical framework, the research will employ it as a prism 
through which to look at the bilateral relations. The structure of the research will proceed as 
follows. 
3.3.1. Phase 1: Assessing energy (in)security as perceived by Hungary 
The research will kick-start from the identification of the perception of energy 
(in)security within the current Hungarian government’s strategy. Butler (2015, p.1) defines 
insecurity as “a situation in which vulnerability from a particular danger or threat is perceived 
to exist”. Within the energy field, the perception of insecurity could be demonstrated through 
the articulation of the vulnerabilities of the energy system of the country. Such tend to be 
present in the strategic documentation. To identify the energy insecurity perception as 
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articulated in the official government discourse, the official strategic documentation will be 
approached. 
 Data selection 
Three official strategy documents will be used – ‘National Security Strategy’ (2012), 
‘National Energy Strategy 2030’ (2012) and ‘National Energy Strategy 2030, with an outlook 
to 2040’ (2020). The documents were produced under Orbán’s second and third cabinets, 
therefore, reflect the official energy policy line of the current government. The latest version 
of the National Energy Strategy has been adopted by the National Security Cabinet in 
February of 2020. It is available on kormany.hu website in Hungarian and will be assessed 
too. 
Another source of data that can be considered for this purpose would be parliamentary 
debates’ records on energy issues of the country. However, these would represent the variety 
of voices of the interest groups and MPs from the various parties. This would diverge from 
the focus of the research which is the official government position. This can be found 
precisely formulated in the national-level strategic documentation, such as the ones mentioned 
above. Therefore, to keep the focus, only the official strategies will be considered. 
 Textual analysis 
The method of textual analysis will be applied to strategic security documentation to 
assess the level of energy (in)security. This method is widely used to approach the analysis of 
qualitative (textual) data in similar studies (Crespy 2015, p.7). However, I will not be 
attempting a quantification of the qualitative textual data. One would call it a ‘content 
analysis’. My purpose is not to identify the frequency of how often the ‘energy (in)security’ is 
met in the National Security Strategy or the National Energy Strategy. These numbers will not 
necessarily indicate the perception of energy (in)security. Instead, I will employ a ‘codebook’ 
of statements and objects that I will be looking for in the two strategies. Crespy (2015, p.8) 
refers to the elements that textual analysis seeks to identify as ‘quotations’: “A quotation is a 
sentence or part of a sentence accounting for an actor, discursive strategy, an object of 
evaluation, an evaluative statement and a secondary topic related to the central topic 
examined”. So in Crespy’s definition, I will be looking for the ‘evaluative statements’ about 
the ‘object of evaluation’, which, in my case, is energy (in)security. Therefore, I will be 
looking for the statements that in one way or another assess energy (in)security in the 
strategies. Namely, I will look for references to ‘import dependence’, ‘the need for 
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diversification of supply’,  ‘the diversification of energy sources’, ‘the need for alternative 
routes of supply’, ‘the need for moving from traditional sources of energy’ and the statements 
in a similar manner. In other words, instead of looking for the numerical presence of certain 
‘markers’ in the documents, I will approach them purely qualitatively. My purpose is to 
identify through textual analysis what perception about energy (in)security those markers 
create. I will identify whether the perception of threat to energy security exists in the official 
strategic documentation. 
3.3.2. Phase 2: Analyzing ‘inequality’ and ‘reciprocity’ in energy relations 
 The second phase of the research will deal with the analysis of the key elements of a 
patron-client relationship, inequality (asymmetry) and reciprocity. However, as it was 
mentioned earlier in the refined version of the patron-client theory, those parameters will be 
assessed solely within the energy field.  
 Inequality 
The inequality, or asymmetry, within the framework of this research, has been defined as 
‘disparity in energy resources’ and, if present, the ‘dependence’ of one actor on energy 
imports of the other. To demonstrate the presence of the inequality in Russo-Hungarian 
energy relations, I will approach the data on the share of Russian energy exports to Hungary 
from official sources, such as energy agencies, EU Commission, the governments. 
Additionally, I will employ secondary literature on the topic to interpret the figures. Similarly 
to Phase 1 of the research, I will employ a textual analysis across a variety of sources. In this 
case, there is no need to design a parameter which will stand for the extent of inequality 
because the numbers on the imports dependency will speak for themselves.  
 Reciprocity 
As was articulated in the earlier section, reciprocity, in my version of the patron-client 
framework, is a mutually beneficial exchange of goods and services. Since my framework is 
set in energy relations, this exchange will be composed of energy transfers. Those, in theory, 
will be helping the client to alleviate its energy insecurity level, being simultaneously 
beneficial for the patron too. Instead of measuring the extent of reciprocity, I will again 
approach it qualitatively. I will employ a thematic analysis on the data related to Russia-
Hungary energy deals and derive the main flagship issues, or markers, that would demonstrate 
‘reciprocity’ in the energy relations. 
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Thematic analysis is a widely used qualitative method that allows approaching large sets 
of data to derive issues/themes that would characterize a certain phenomenon. It is an 
especially helpful tool as part of larger discourse analysis. It allows identifying arguments, 
statements and narratives across large amounts of textual data like governmental 
documentation, transcripts of parliamentary debates, officials’ speeches or media articles. 
Tichý (2019) in his “EU-Russia Energy Relations: A Discursive Approach” advocates it as a 
helpful technic for approaching the study of energy relations between EU and Russia from a 
discursive point of view. He describes the method as follows: 
Thematic analysis is a method that is founded on the strategy and process of 
searching for and finding key themes to characterise a given phenomenon. 
In principle, this research strategy quite closely resembles the multiple reading of 
source texts. The key is to uncover the patterns of content organisation and 
relations within the analysed data, through which the emerging themes become 
analytical categories (Tichý 2019, p.69). 
 
Within Tichý’s research, thematic analysis is a helpful tool for identifying key themes and 
patterns across an enormous set of data – his level of analysis is energy relations between 
large entities – the EU and the Russian Federation. Hence, instead of doing a particularized 
content analysis of a limited set of data, a larger thematic one across the variety of sources 
was a more beneficial technique to go with. Similarly, Braun and Clarke (2012, p.55) 
advocate the technique for its flexibility when processing large sets of data: 
 
TA is a method for systematically identifying, organising, and offering insight 
into, patterns of meaning (themes) across a dataset. Through focusing on meaning 
across a dataset, TA allows the researcher to see and make sense of collective or 
shared meanings and experiences. Identifying unique and idiosyncratic meanings 
and experiences found only within a single data item is not the focus of TA. This 
method, then, is a way of identifying what is common to the way a topic is talked 
or written about, and of making sense of those commonalities. 
 
Here and in Tichý’s commentary on the method, it is emphasized how a thematic analysis 
comes in helpful when identifying key themes across large mixed data sets. In my case as 
well, to identify ‘reciprocal’ energy deals between Hungary and Russia, I will need to source 
data from a mixed set – primary documentation, secondary literature, editorial commentary 
and reporting. Within these, I will have to identify patterns/markers/themes that would stand 
for reciprocal energy deals. Hence, instead of focusing in-depth on a limited set of data, I 




3.3.3. Phase 3: Analyzing ‘proximity’ 
 In my definition, proximity stands for the critical perception of the relationship as 
being close. This would be identified in the ‘constructivist’ elements of the relationship, or 
non-tangible, such as in the frequency of meetings, speeches at the press conferences, 
rhetorical support for each other in the international organizations. In the case of Russia and 
Hungary, ‘proximity’ is a widely used reference to define their relationship, especially in the 
media headlines. However, both the media and the academic literature do not attempt the 
thorough analysis to identify what makes this perceived proximity that striking. Therefore, my 
analysis of ‘proximity’ will be performed via the analysis of rhetoric coming from the leaders 
of two states. 
 Textual analysis 
 The textual analysis will be applied to carefully selected and sourced set of data. To 
start with, various officials’ commentaries on [Russo-Hungarian] bilateral relations on both 
sides can be found in numerous sources, contexts, periods and settings. Therefore, firstly, it is 
essential to set a specific time frame along which data will be selected. Since the focus of this 
research is the bilateral relations covering the period of Viktor Orbán’s second term as Prime 
Minister, the time frame would, hence, be 2010-now. However, President Putin was reelected 
in 2012 only. Since the relations saw an intensification while both Putin and Orbán were in 
power, it would be rational to stick to the period that Putin came back to power in Russia as a 
President. Therefore, it leaves us with the 2012 – 2020 time frame. Secondly, it is crucial to 
select a limited range of officials whose speeches will be analyzed. In Russia, key decision-
makers of foreign policy throughout 2012 – 2020 have been represented by President 
Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev (since 2020 changed to Mikhail 
Mishustin) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. In Hungary, this list would be 
represented by the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter 
Szijjártó (2014-now). Péter Szijjártó also was a state secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office 
before 2014 in charge of China-Hungary and Russia-Hungary bilateral relations. However, 
looking at the key negotiators of bilateral meetings two figures stand out – President Putin 
and Prime Minister Orbán. While the discourse on bilateral relations is also additionally 
framed by the Foreign Ministers, the key statements shaping the perception of the relations, 
nevertheless, belong to Putin and Orbán. Therefore, the analysis will be applied to Putin’s and 
Orbán’s statements only. Thirdly, the leaders’ statements would vary on a context. Orbán’s 
commentaries on relations with Russia to the German newspaper Bild would differ from those 
he gives to the “Good morning Hungary” radio programme or the speeches he makes at the 
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press conferences after bilateral meetings with Putin. Within the framework of this research, 
since one of the main features explored is reciprocity, it is crucial to find out how the leaders 
shape the perception of the bilateral relationship when faced vis-à-vis each other. Therefore, 
the scope of the commentaries will be limited to Orbán’s and Putin’s statements made at the 
press conferences after their meetings. Fourthly, the speeches need to be properly sourced. 
Luckily, both of the leaders have official websites that contain the transcripts of the speeches 
– miniszterelnok.hu for Orbán and президент.рф for Putin. Moreover, the Hungarian 
government’s website kormany.hu also has the transcriptions of Orbán’s speeches. Putin’s 
website though provides a more detailed report on the press conferences – it contains the 
speeches of both leaders, Q&A session if any took place and also video footage of the press 
conferences for some of the meetings. Kormany.hu and miniszterelnok.hu contain only 
Orbán’s speeches made during the press conferences and sometimes miss either Hungarian or 
English version of the speeches. Therefore, all of the websites will be used to source the data. 
As per the language, Putin’s speeches will be analyzed in the original language - Russian. 
Orbán’s statements will be first looked at in English and then for the selected narratives, 
Hungarian versions will be considered to make sure the meaning does not get lost in 
translation. The Q&A (if present) will also be included in the analysis since in most of the 
cases they [Q&As] contain an elaboration on the points the leaders mentioned in the speeches. 
The Q&As (if present) are available in Russian on Putin’s website. In sum, the dataset will 
contain nine transcriptions of the press conferences from 2013-2020.  
I will analyze these speeches for the presence of ‘proximity’ indicators. One of them 
will be ‘affectivity’, as articulated in Carney’s (1989) framework. This indicator can be 
spotted in the statements on the intensifying affinity or loyalty. This category would include 
the statements that describe the relationship as being driven by the factors going beyond pure 
materialistic ones – references to shared historical events, shared values or shared 
understandings of events or phenomena. Therefore, in Orbán’s and Putin’s speeches I will 
look for the references to these. Additionally, the concepts of ‘trust’, ‘respect’, ‘loyalty’, 
‘reliability’ would signify the presence of conceptual proximity as well. 
The analysis of ‘proximity’ is particularly important within the context of ‘aura’ 
surrounding the bilateral relations. While the media keeps referring to the ideological 
convergence between the two states, the academic literature does not manage to address this 
labelling adequately. Meanwhile, my research aims to concentrate on the main component of 
the bilateral relations – energy, but analyzing ‘proximity’ in the third phase of the research 
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will address the rhetorical component that is heavily ignored in the academic literature. By 
combining the analysis of energy relations with the analysis of the conceptual element of the 
relationship, my research can potentially highlight why this relationship is receiving so much 
attention in the international circles, especially the European ones. 
3.4. Research limitations. Potential contribution. 
 By applying the refined version of the patron-client framework into this case, I am not 
aiming at proving or disproving the existence of patron-client relations between Russia and 
Hungary. The purpose of this research is not to make the case for the usage of ‘patron’ and 
‘client’ terminology to refer to Russo-Hungarian energy relations. The main component of the 
patron-client relationship, the client’s compliance, would miss in this case anyways due to 
institutional constraints. Namely, due to Hungary’s NATO and EU membership – in many 
spheres (military, economic, political) it cannot go against its actual ‘paternal’ organizations. 
However, the cooperation in the energy field is there, as well as the ‘critical conceptual’ or 
‘constructivist’ element. None of the literature so far managed to bring in the analysis of these 
two together. In other words, this particular research design while seeking to answer the main 
research question – what is the cornerstone of current Russo-Hungarian relations – brings in a 
fresh critical perspective to the issue. The patron-client framework as presented by my 
research design is a potentially useful ‘prism’ to look through at the bilateral relationship 
between Russia and Hungary. It leaves aside analytically non-viable and speculative 
arguments and focuses solely on well-sourced hard evidence while critically engaging with it. 
 It is essential to understand that the research is being done under a severe constraint – 
the limited access to primary sources, such as official documentation on energy deals. It is 
especially the case with the Paks deal, for which the documentation has been classified and 
concealed from the public eye motivated by energy security concerns. My thematic textual 
analysis can go as far as accessing the available documentation and secondary literature on 
the topic – published academic articles, think-tanks publications and editorial commentary. 
Therefore, my research results will be constrained by the data available. 
 In sum, while seeking to give answers to what is the actual foundation of the current 
Russo-Hungarian relations, my research also brings in a new critical perspective. Namely, it 
looks at the relationship from an angle that has not been utilized in the literature so far or tells 
a story in a different way, so to say. It brings in the assessment of the energy tie between the 
countries, combined with the analysis of the rhetorical part of the relationship. Moreover, in 
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comparison to the existing studies, my research utilizes a reviewed theoretical framework, 
based on the exploration of the existing theoretical literature. The research design relies on the 
reviewed version of the theory that before had almost become extinct. The interstate patron-
client theory has not seen the theoretical exploration or application since the end of the Cold 
War. My research design provides potential research avenues both for this framework and for 























Chapter 4. Data review and analysis 
 This chapter will review and analyze the data that has been collected as described in 
the previous methodological chapter. 
4.1. Phase 1: The identification of threat perception to Hungary’s energy security 
 Two strategic documents were analyzed in English and one in Hungarian to identify 
the level of energy (in)security as perceived by the current Hungarian government – ‘National 
Security Strategy’ (2012), ‘National Energy Strategy 2030’ (2012) and ‘Nemzeti 
Energiastratégia 2030, kitekintéssel 2040-ig’ (National Energy Strategy 2030, with an outlook 
to 2040, 2020). The results are slightly mixed. 
 To start with, the ‘National Security Strategy’ is the document that is supposed to 
articulate security strategy provisions in a traditional sense (military security) primarily, with 
other types of security (cyber, financial, environmental) receiving less coverage. This is why 
energy security in this document receives just limited coverage. At first, the energy security, 
due to geographical conditions, is mentioned among Hungary’s vulnerabilities together with 
supply routes and environmental security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary 2012, p.9). 
Energy security later receives a whole paragraph under ‘Security Threats and Challenges for 
Hungary and Their Management’ section (Ibid., p.9). However, the paragraph on energy 
security comes in way further after such challenges as regional conflicts, proliferation of the 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, financial security and energy security. Hence, 
according to the listing order of threats and challenges in the ‘National Security Strategy’, 
energy security, even though being a vulnerability, does not come in first. In that paragraph 
on energy security, the strategy articulates that the main concern is import dependence, with 
the diversity of sources and the routes of supply being way behind the hoped-for level and, 
therefore, posing huge risks (Ibid., p.14). That is, the ‘National Security Strategy’ portrays 
energy security as potentially posing risks and challenges among other threats to national 
security.  
 The ‘National Energy Strategy 2030’ (2012) produced by the Ministry of 
Development, in contrast, elaborates extensively solely on energy security issues. The fact 
that Energy outlook was presented by the government signified a larger change in the energy 
sector ownership. In 2011 Fidesz’s cabinet went on to buy out 21.5% of its oil and gas giant 
MOL (Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyilvanosan Mukodo Részvénytársaság) from the Russian 
company Surgut to regain state ownership over the utility sector (Butler 2018, p.168). 
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Regaining control over the strategically important sector, the government had the upper hand 
now to set out the outlook for the Hungarian energy future, as well as to articulate the 
vulnerabilities of the national energy system. Containing 127 pages of material, the ‘Energy 
Strategy’ outlines the official Hungarian outlook on its energy issues across the spheres – 
fossil fuels, renewable energy, nuclear energy, gas market, electricity and so on. The 
‘Hungarian Situation’ section of ‘State of Affairs’ chapter, in particular, presents the vision of 
the current energy issues for Hungary. The section mentions an important issue that is 
elaborated elsewhere across the commentaries – an 80% dependence on gas imports from 
Russia coming to Hungary through the only available route – the Druzhba pipeline (Ministry 
of National Development 2012, p.28). This poses potential risks for the security of supply. 
However, the same section mentions how these risks are to some extent mitigated by the vast 
gas storage facilities which Hungary has access to, ranking them one of the largest in the EU. 
The strategy argues the storage facilities can accommodate as much as around 50 per cent of 
the annual gas consumption (Ibid., p.29). Moreover, electricity production-wise, the strategy 
sheds a light on the high hopes behind nuclear energy as the driver of electricity production. 
Nevertheless, since the primary energy sources have been extensively relying on the natural 
gas in the past decade, with the decrease of coal mining, such an insecure supply scheme 
poses long-term risks for the energy security sector. That is why the ‘Energy Strategy’ sets 
out tasks (pillars) that the energy sector should strive to achieve. 
 The five important steps that the strategy articulates are the increase of energy savings 
and energy efficiency, the intensification of the use of renewable energy, the integration of 
Central European grid network, the maintenance of the acting nuclear capabilities and eco-
friendly use of coal and lignite. These five goals are intended to achieve what the authors call 
the key message of the strategy – “our purpose is to seek ways out of our energy dependency” 
(Ibid., p.11). However, the controversy of the need to get rid of this energy dependence and 
the impossibility to do so in the short-term is stated in the strategy itself: “…Hungary 
obviously cannot be entirely independent in terms of energy supply… however, it should still 
strive for energy independence” (Ibid., p.11). Hence, in the “Vision” section of the strategy, it 
is articulated that the balanced structure of the sources is to be achieved through the 
diversification of supply sources which will eventually push the price competition (Ibid., 
p.63). These are the essential measures for decreasing the country’s energy vulnerability. The 
strategy suggests seeking to ensure the stability of supply from Russia in the short-term, while 
simultaneously seeking long-term alternatives, such as LNG trade and alternative pipelines.  
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 The latest 2020 strategy in many ways repeats the provisions of its predecessor. This is 
why it still targets 2030 primarily, with additional outlook to 2040. The brand-new strategy 
still perceives a threat to energy security because it aims at so-called “Maximum 
Diversification”. It articulates that primarily gas still will be supplied through the multiannual 
contract with Russia, but it will not be the only source. The aim is to achieve the 
diversification of gas supply from the four following sources – Russia, Romania, LNG and 
Western Market (Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium 2020a, p.20). Moreover, the threat 
perception is still present from the potential supply disruption resulting from the political 
cleavages between Ukraine and Russia (Ibid., p.21). This is the echo of the 2006 and 2009 
supply crises, when due to the Russo-Ukrainian rate disputes, the gas supply to Europe was 
cut off for a couple of weeks. Between the production of the previous energy strategy in 2012 
and the latest one in 2020, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has taken a larger geopolitical spin 
due to the proxy-war in the East of Ukraine. Hence, realizing an even greater risk, the strategy 
stipulates, so that to mitigate this risk and to strengthen the bargaining position vis-à-vis 
Russia, the diversification is essential. These risks are further counterbalanced by the 
elaboration on what steps were completed earlier to mitigate them. The document outlines 
that Hungary has connected its gas network through the interconnectors to all the 
neighbouring countries, except for Slovenia (Ibid.). The high hopes are put on the south-west, 
south-north and cross-border capacities within Hungary (Ibid., p.21). To draw a comparative 
conclusion, the insecurity perception did not change much between the previous strategy and 
the latest one. The same threats are still present, such as of unexpected supply disruptions, as 
well as the goals remain uncompleted – supply source and route diversification. This is why 
eight years later, the 2020 Energy Strategy still poses targets for the year of 2030. Although 
the efforts to mitigate the risks have been done, they were not enough to mitigate them to the 
desired level. 
 Hence, the general perception of the threat to the energy security of Hungary could be 
assessed as mild. On the one hand, the strategiс documentation acknowledges that energy 
dependency and the dependency on the imports of Russian natural gas and oil is there. 
Moreover, the supply routes of natural gas, that is essential for the functioning of the 
industries and households, are extremely limited. The supply, therefore, is exposed to 
potential disruption risks. However, the storage facilities of Hungary are expansive. This, to 
some extent, mitigates the negative consequences of potential supply disruptions. Besides, the 
latest documentation is quite ambitious and sets out the clear vision of its “Maximum 
Diversification” strategy. However, in the short-term, the dependency tie of the energy sector 
44 
 
to the supplies of Russia is there, with a limited diversification of supply routes, as well as 
with the small number of alternative sources. Therefore, the risks and threats are present. Due 
to this, the energy security level cannot be categorized as low. However, considering the other 
sources of energy Hungary is using, as well as the natural gas storage facilities, the insecurity 
cannot be categorized as high or even average. Hence, it would be fair to argue, based on the 
analysis of the documentation, that Hungary’s energy security threat level is mild. 
4.2. Phase 2: Inequality and reciprocity assessment in energy relations. 
4.2.1. Inequality assessment 
 Hungary’s dependency on Russian energy imports is widely reported (see Table 1 and 
Table 2). It has been covered earlier as part of the literature review since the academic work 
incorporates it into the analysis. However, as part of this research design, inequality or 
asymmetry in the energy field between Russia and Hungary was assessed once again. The 
analysis of the statistical data from official sources, such as European Commission’s 
factsheets on the state of Energy Union for EU countries highlights a major asymmetry 
through demonstrating the numbers on Hungary’s import dependence on Russian energy. 
 European Commission in its 2017 factsheets on Energy Union estimated Hungary’s 
energy consumption dependency on imports to be around 53% in 2015 with a 54% EU 
average (European Commission 2017a, p.4). The tables below demonstrate that import 
dependency on natural gas and crude oil scored approximately 70% and 91% respectively in 
2015 (Table 1). Therefore, since it was discussed earlier, it does not come as a surprise now 
that the top supplier of those for Hungary is Russia. Table 2 demonstrates that 95% of natural 
gas imports are supplied by Russia, and 81.1% of crude oil and NGL (natural gas liquids) too. 
In the nuclear energy field too, the report argues that the fuel is supplied solely by Russia 
(Ibid.).  
 




Table 2. 2015: Top non-EU suppliers for main energy carriers (European Commission 2017a, 
p.4). 
In this regard, it is important to highlight that the same factsheet assesses Hungary’s reliance 
on natural gas for heat production as one of the highest in the EU (European Commission 
2017a, p.9). Data from other sources suggest that the proportion of natural gas in Hungary’s 
general energy mix was as high as 35.4% in 2013, which is the highest in the CEE region and 
is double as high as of neighbouring Poland or Czechia (Posaner 2020, p.224). Hence, the 
secure supply and the affordability of prices, the report articulates, are of the key strategic 
importance to Hungary. This is reflected in the strategic documentation and has been 
discussed in the section above.  
 Similarly, the analysis of Eurostat’s data demonstrated an overwhelming reliance on 
natural gas and oil imports too. Eurostat’s statistical books series on “Energy, transport and 
environment statistics” highlight that Hungary’s dependency on natural gas is one of the 
highest in the EU. In 2017, the net imports of natural gas in Hungary were 96.3% in 
comparison to 74.3% EU average (Eurostat 2019, p.189). The net imports of oil and 
petroleum products too were significant as according to the 2017 statistics – 86.6%, which is 
almost an equivalent of the EU average of 86.7% (Ibid.). Meanwhile, while Hungary places 
high stakes on electricity production from its nuclear power capabilities of the Paks nuclear 
plant, the current level of electricity generation from nuclear plants remains low. In 2017, it 
was only 1.4 million tonnes of oil equivalent in comparison to 71.3 million tonnes as the EU 
average (Ibid.). The situation with energy production from renewables remains below the 
desired level as well. The primary production of renewables and biofuels in Hungary in 2017 




In sum, while renewables and nuclear plant capabilities remain just long-term 
ambitions, the dependence on natural gas and oil remains significant for Hungary. Not only 
they compose the main sources of energy production, their primary production in Hungary is 
almost non-existent. Both natural gas and oil are imported and have a predominant supplier in 
Hungary’s case – Russia. Hence, the inequality in the energy nexus of Russia-Hungary energy 
relations is undeniable. Hungary’s heavy import dependence on Russian natural gas and oil, 
as has been discussed earlier in the literature review, is apparent and, as tendencies 
demonstrate, will probably still be there for some time to come. 
4.2.2. Reciprocity assessment 
 The literature review has already demonstrated that energy is one of the key 
components of Russia-Hungary bilateral relations. Even though trade was the initial catalyst 
of Orbán’s foreign policy to Russia, the trade figures (not including energy trade turnover) did 
not end up where they were initially planned to. In contrast, energy trade figures make up the 
main portion of the bilateral budget together with the scheduled investment projects, such as 
in the nuclear field. 
 A thematic textual analysis of reciprocal energy deals in the Russo-Hungarian case has 
been employed onto a broad set of data – academic literature on the topic, think-tank papers, 
media pieces and governmental decrees. The most demonstrative and convenient way to 
present the results of this is to adopt an issue-based approach. The issues below were derived 
from the broad textual thematic analysis and are the main markers of the ‘reciprocity’ in the 
bilateral energy relations. These ‘issues’ have been discussed the most and met across 
throughout the analysis, hence, are commonly agreed ‘markers’ of the bilateral energy 
relationship. These issues are 1) gas deals; 2) Paks nuclear plant project; 3) cooperation on 
pipeline projects. 
 Gas deals 
The thematic textual analysis has identified the following commonly agreed 
phenomenon within the bilateral energy trade - Hungary’s natural gas supply deals with 
Russia have often been “conveniently timed” (Deák and Weiner 2019) and even that the 
relationship has acquired a quid pro quo nature or reached the extent of “gas diplomacy” 
(Deák et. al 2015). Long-term gas supply bilateral contracts tend to be less conveniently 
priced for the consumer, hence, induce high energy costs (Butler 2015, p.1). Therefore, 
securing a favourable rate for at least a short-term and achieving flexible provisions from the 
contractor would be beneficial for the recipient country. A significant body of literature and 
editorial commentary argues that Hungary has been managing to secure those with Russia. 
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Namely, the ‘handiness’ of the successful gas deals with Russia for Orbán’s government is 
widely documented across the sources. Similarly, gas cooperation has been equally enjoyed 
by the other side, the Russian government. Hence, successful gas deals are one example of 
‘reciprocity’ between Hungary and Russia in the energy sector. 
The analysis demonstrated that two main factors influenced the securitization of 
natural gas supply for Hungary. This, as was discussed above, reflected itself in the 
Hungarian strategic documentation. The two factors were the gas supply disruption crises and 
utilities’ affordability concern. In 2006, a dispute over payment rates between Russia and 
Hungary resulted in a gas supply suspension through Ukraine to Europe with Hungary, 
eventually, losing around 60% of gas capacity in its pipelines (Butler 2018, p.166). Similarly, 
on January 1st, 2009, Russia cut the gas supply to Ukraine again due to the inability to reach 
consensus on the price rates, resulting in over two weeks of gas shortages in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Haitas 2018, p.372). The two cases served as litmus tests for the need of 
securitization of gas supply – both through the increase in gas storages and through supply 
sources’ and routes’ diversification. While the latter ones remain medium-term and long-term 
priorities, the former one has been achieved. In 2006 ‘Safety Stockpiling of Natural Gas Act’ 
paved the way for certain provisions that enabled the construction of underground storage 
facilities accommodating an equivalent of 40 days if potential gas disruptions were to happen 
again (Butler 2018, p.166). Whereas in 2009 Hungarian MOL used the EBRD’s (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development) loan to finance a purchase of the gas storage 
facility in Croatia. At mid-2014, Hungary’s storage facilities’ capacity was estimated to be as 
high as 50% of Hungary’s annual gas consumption (European Commission 2015, p.228). It is 
worth noting that, as data suggest, Russian Gazprom warmly meets Hungary’s gas storage 
increases. Russia’s side of the interest is that Hungary’s storage hub can serve as a further 
delivery point to the Balkans (Posaner 2020, p. 229). While the security of supply issues were 
to some extent addressed by the storage facilities, the affordability concern became the core of 
Fidesz’s policies. Making it part of their larger Hungary First campaign that prioritizes the 
national interest over any other, Fidesz’s government sought to make utilities’ prices more 
affordable for the Hungarian households.  
The analysis across the various sources has demonstrated that decreasing utility prices 
for households have secured Fidesz its reelection in the 2014 parliamentary elections. This 
was possible by virtue of re-nationalization of the energy sector campaign that has been 
conducted by Fidesz’s government in 2012-2013. In 2012 Fidesz forced out the foreign 
ownerships of key utility companies in Hungary through introducing unbearable taxes. To 
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take control over pricing, the state-owned electricity giant MVM (Magyar Villamos Művek 
Zártkörűen működő Részvénytársaság) bought out from the German E.ON its subsidiaries in 
charge of gas storage and trade in 2013 (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.6). Since then the 
government was able to directly negotiate with Gazprom over long-term supply contracts. 
Namely, although de jure the contracting corporate parties (Hungarian MVM and Russian 
Gazprom) are to be in charge of negotiations, due to the governmental ownership of these, the 
talks over contracts are held on the top level (Butler 2018, p.169). Moreover, having 
nationalized the gas distributor, any cuts in utility prices were now the financial burden for the 
state-owned MVM utility company (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.9). This is where Gazprom’s 
rate reductions came in handy. In 2013, Gazprom offered some beneficial rate reductions over 
the LTCs – long-term contracts on gas imports. Whereas in February of 2014, while Paks II 
deal was getting sealed, Gazprom offered further concessions in take-or-pay provisions of the 
gas contract (Ibid., p.9). Thanks to these gestures, Fidesz managed to significantly cut the 
utility bills of the households while also minimizing the financial burden for the budget. 
Hungarian wholesale import prices for the Russian gas got to the level below the EU average 
in 2014 (Posaner 2020, p.226). Fidesz’s government managed to drop the utility rates by 
around a quarter amid the 2013-2014 election campaign, further boosting its electorate from 
1.3 million in 2012 to 2.1 million of votes in the April 2014 elections (Deák  2014b). It is 
widely agreed that the “gas campaign” (major utility cuts) helped Fidesz to secure a landslide 
victory (Deák 2014b; Ámon and Deák 2015; Theisen 2015; Deák and Weiner 2019). 
However, it is important to note that such concessions on Gazprom’s side were not 
unprecedented. The data indicate that similar reductions have been offered earlier to the 
Western European purchasers (Posaner 2020). Nevertheless, for the CEE region, such a move 
was rather unprecedented. Taking this into consideration and the political context at the 
moment [pre-election period], the academic and editorial commentary suggests that the 
concessions were made in line with the Hungarian government’s political interests. 
Similarly, in 2015, during Putin’s visit to Budapest in February, the main issue on the 
agenda was the about-to-expire gas LTC. Instead of signing a long-term contract though, the 
parties agreed on a short-term stop-gap contract to cover Hungarian imports up to 2020 
(Posaner 2020, p.222). Under the negotiated deal the ‘take-or-pay’ provisions were dropped, 
allowing Hungary to import the unused gas from the 1996 contract later on, as well as to pay 
for it as soon as received (Ibid.). As Posaner (2020, p.226) argues, the Hungarian case is one 




In this particular case, the Hungarian’s side benefit is undeniable. However, Hungary’s 
reliance on Gazprom’s LTCs has been decreasing with years in the past decade and the 
strategic documentation plans on decreasing it even more. The consumption rate fell from 13 
to 8 bcm in less than ten years (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.9). Moreover, the brand-new 
Hungarian National Energy and Climate Plan from 2020 (Magyarország Nemzeti Energia- és 
Klímaterve) articulates how Hungary has managed to increase its storage facilities so that to 
account for the possible gas supply disruptions (Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium 
2020b, p.110). Hungary has solid interconnectors capacity, connecting it to all the bordering 
countries except for Slovenia – this will ensure the supply of gas in case of the crisis. The 
plan also sets out to diversify the supply of gas up to four independent sources by 2030 – 
Russia, Romania, LNG, and the gas from the Western European markets (Ibid., p.106). As per 
the supplies of Russian gas, the route as well is expected to be changed – from 2021 onwards, 
the strategy claims to expect gas transportations primarily from the second branch of 
Turkstream, a southern route from Serbia (Ibid., p.107). Besides, the plan articulates that the 
wholesaler competition that has been set as a target by 2012 Energy strategy between the gas 
purchased from Russian traders and the gas bought from the Western European stock markets 
has been achieved (Ibid., p.236). In sum, the plan sketches out the future for the gas market 
optimistically. However, the realization that the reliance on Russian gas imports will persist in 
the short- and medium-term is also there. Therefore, the latest Energy Strategy articulates that 
all the above-mentioned implementations will help the Hungarian side to strengthen its 
bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia for post-2021 import agreements (Innovációs és 
Technológiai Minisztérium 2020a, p.23). In sum, as much as Gazprom’s concessions and 
flexibility provisions were beneficial for the Hungarian government at times, the latter strives 
to improve its bargaining position for any future negotiations.  
The benefit of such gas contracts for Russia is rather limited though. Apart from 
Hungary being a “trustworthy, able-to-pay and stable partner”, as Putin put it at the 2017 
bilateral meeting in Budapest, there is not much ‘added value’ for Russia. However, 
economically speaking, having a committed buyer for Gazprom allows it to strengthen its 
stance in the European energy market (Tichý 2019, p.22). 70% of Gazprom’s profits come 
from the sales to the European market, whereas 20% of this amount goes into the national 
budget (Ibid.). Additionally, Hungary’s willingness to get the Russian gas along the 
maximally diversified routes demonstrates its willingness to cooperate on the various pipeline 
projects – this is going to be analyzed in the following section. Budapest’s receptiveness in 
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the gas field signals out to Moscow the trustworthiness when it comes to the Russian gas 
supply through the already existing pipelines, as well as through the planned ones. 
 Cooperation on pipeline projects 
The thematic analysis identified that Hungarian and Russian attitudes were reciprocal 
over certain pipeline projects. As it has already been discussed, Budapest has been seeking the 
diversification of gas supply routes. It demonstrated support for the pipeline projects and 
regional interconnectors that would mitigate its heavy reliance on the ‘Druzhba’ pipeline that 
crosses Ukraine. One of the main demonstrations of Hungary’s support for Russia-initiated 
pipelines was its commitment to the South Stream pipeline project. 
Put on the agenda in 2006 and cancelled in 2014, South Stream plan saw two 
Hungarian governments in the office – Gyurcsany’s and Orbán’s. While back in opposition, 
the current Prime Minister strongly opposed Hungarian involvement in the project and 
criticized the now ex-prime minister for the engagement. Fidesz’s turn to the project 
happened in 2012 when the alternatively routing projects, such as Nabucco-West, got 
cancelled and were off the table (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.7). The pipeline was supposed to 
bring the Russian gas under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, therefore bypassing Ukraine, and then 
onwards to Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria. The cabinet’s commitment to the South 
Stream went as far as making the necessary provisions in the legislation. In 2014, the 
Parliament passed legislation which clarified the status of the companies that might be 
involved in the construction of the South Stream on the Hungarian territory. Namely, the 
company did not have to be an official gas transmitter. This allowed Gazprom to step its foot 
in Hungary for the construction of the South Stream (Gotev 2014). This piece of legislation 
was against the EU’s Third Energy Package. According to it, the pipelines on the EU territory 
cannot be in the ownership of natural gas extractors since this would violate the EU 
competition rules (Ibid.). Hence, the legislative move demonstrates how strong Hungary’s 
commitment was in supporting the Kremlin-led project. Russia’s motivation for the project 
was two-sided. Firstly, it would allow strengthening its position as the primary gas supplier to 
the CEE region. Secondly, it would grant Russia a new Southern access connection to the 
European market while also leaving Ukraine off the route (Butler 2015, p.4). In sum, although 
the project was cancelled in 2014 due to Bulgaria’s inability to legalize similar provisions 
domestically, South Stream is a showcase of the reciprocity Russia and Hungary managed to 
achieve in the energy field.  
However, it is essential to mention that Hungary was not solely all into the Russia-led 
South Stream. Eager to engage in pipeline projects that would diversify the source of supply, 
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Hungary also supported South Stream’s competitor – Nabucco pipeline. The pipeline was 
meant to supply the gas from the countries of the Caspian Sea basin, therefore threatening 
Russia’s monopoly on gas exports to Europe. The project was warmly met because it stood 
for the diversification of the source of supply and, hence, meant the potential breaking off 
from the Russian energy grip. Despite having huge political support, the pipeline building was 
cancelled due to the lack of financial feasibility.  
Soon after the South Stream was put off the table, Russia came up with an alternative 
joint Russia-Turkey pipeline - Turkstream. The route was planned to supply gas from Russia 
through the Black Sea to Turkey. Two further transit extensions were proposed. First, Tesla 
pipeline that would go via Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary further to Austria. 
There were no developments on it since 2015 so the project is assumed to be abandoned. The 
second option, an Eastring pipeline, is being under construction now and will connect 
Bulgaria to Slovakia through Romania and Hungary. Eastring has been widely supported by 
the CEE governments, since it manages to deliver same diversification results as, for example, 
Nabucco would, but is significantly cheaper and easier to implement (Butler 2015, p.7). The 
supplies to Hungary via Turkstream are reported to launch as soon as by the end of 2021 
(Abouthungary.hu 2020). During the press conference after the latest Russia-Hungary 
bilateral meeting, Orbán claimed it is of utmost priority for Hungary to join Turkstream as 
soon as possible since it would diversify the routing of the Russian gas supplies while also 
bypassing Ukraine (Orbán 2019). In this scenario too, Russia’s and Hungary’s interests 
intersected. 
Hungary’s interest in the various Russia-backed pipelines is clear – it wishes to 
diversify supply routes so that to mitigate the risks of possible gas supply crisis through 
Druzhba pipeline that crosses Ukraine. Russia’s interest in Hungary’s and other partners’ 
support is of larger strategic importance. Firstly, it is in Russia’s interest too to decrease its 
dependence on transit countries, such as Ukraine, especially within the context of the political 
crisis in bilateral relations with Ukraine (Tichý 2019, p.25). As a supplier, it is crucial for 
Moscow to commit to its contractual obligations and for its clients to receive the good [gas] 
without any potential disruptions or risks of supply disruptions. Additionally, it maximizes 
Gazprom’s profits (Ibid.). Secondly, on a larger scale, it intensifies Gazprom’s overall stance 
in the European energy market. Not only pipelines imply LTCs and, hence, are long-term 
investments, pipelines’ construction also involves joint ventures and businesses involved in 
the construction of the pipelines, in the storage or retail of gas in these countries. In other 
words, via its subsidiaries involved in the various stages of the gas industry, Russia can keep 
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holding a tight grip on the European energy market. Thirdly, for Russia, such energy 
instruments as pipelines also induce political leverage in Russia’s foreign policy toolkit. In 
this manner, Russia reportedly uses the countries’ energy dependence on its sources to extract 
political services. As such, its energy projects, such as pipelines, tend to gain control over 
local energy firms and companies that oversee the construction of the pipelines so that to 
further extract economic and political services from those (Ibid., p.26). This, as a result, 
allows Russia to strengthen bilateral relations with a country if high-profile political figures 
are involved in energy companies’ ownership. Such was the case with Hungary. The bridge 
between the governments was established on the basis of South Stream negotiations. Since the 
main energy company in Hungary was rearranged into state ownership, the negotiations on 
LTCs and pipelines fell under high-level statesmen’s jurisdiction. Based on this, the very tops 
of the governance hierarchy were able to establish a closer contact.  
In sum, although Hungary supported not only Russia-backed pipeline projects, such as 
South Stream or Turkstream, but also its competitors, such as Nabucco, it is still clear that 
reciprocity on several crucial for Russia projects has been achieved. It is both in Hungary’s 
and Russia’s interest to pave the way for the alternative supply routes that would bypass 
Ukraine. This allows Hungary to increase its energy supply security to some extent, while 
Russia expands its strategic energy network via the pipelines on the European ground.  
 Paks 
During the textual thematic analysis, the Paks nuclear power plant deal proved to be 
the main bilateral reciprocity pinpoint between the Hungarian and Russian governments. The 
decision to sign a contract with Russian Rosatom in 2014 to renew two blocks of the Paks 
nuclear plant in Hungary came as a surprise for the public since no prior consultations were 
made with any interest groups. Neither were any feasibility studies published by the 
government about the project. However, most importantly, the Hungarian government 
classified all the Paks deal-related documentation, therefore, limiting the access to the public 
eye. This left academia and expert community with more questions than answers. 
There are several major concerns around the deal. Firstly, why considering the size of 
the deal and its importance, no prior communications with the interest groups regarding the 
deal were conducted. Paks electricity production accounts for around 50% of the total 
electricity output in Hungary. Since half of the electricity in the country is estimated to be 
supplied by nuclear power, it was put on the agenda in the 2012 Energy Strategy. Given the 
strategic importance of the issue for the country, the absence of the public consultations 
behind 10 billion euro-worth deal comes in puzzling. The budget of the deal is around 12% of 
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the current Hungarian GDP (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.10). The scale of the project means 
public funds will be flowing into this investment for some years to come. Therefore, both the 
expert community and the public raised their eyebrows when Rosatom was instantly 
presented as a contractor. Secondly, it is unclear why the government decided to grant the 
contract to Russia instead of arranging a tender competition in which other foreign companies 
were expected to compete too. Neither the government released an official explanation for 
that nor it provided public access to all the related documentation. In fact, to shield all the 
deal-related information, legislative provisions were arranged. A parliamentary bill from 2015 
made an exemption for the deal and shielded it from the Freedom of Information Act (Ibid., 
p.11). As a result, all the information on funding and construction of the reactors will not be 
accessible to the public eye for thirty years. This prevented the expert community from 
conducting detailed feasibility studies on the project. However, even with the limited data, the 
experts’ assessments argue that the provisions of the deal are highly opaque and pose huge 
risks for the Hungarian side of the contract. Thirdly, the deal provisions even faced problems 
within the EU circles. The EU Commission has been launching an infringement procedure 
against the deal having concerns over competition and transparency aspects of the project. 
The case was dropped in 2017 reportedly due to Hungary insisting on ‘technical exclusivity’ 
of Rosatom’s offer and promising to hold bids for subcontracts on the later steps of the project 
implementation (European Commission 2017b; Stefanini and Hirst 2017). 
 The available feasibility studies point to huge potential corruption risks involved 
behind the deal management. Due to the large-scale nature of the project, the experts assess 
the potential percentage of bribery involved in such a huge investment to be as high as 13-
16% (Fazekas et. al 2014, p.3). The very same study stipulates that potential risks might arise 
from the information asymmetry between Rosatom as a contractor and Paks as a client (Ibid., 
p.4). Namely, Russia represented by Rosatom supplies a new technology under the contract 
provisions in which the Hungarian side has less expertise and knowledge. Hence, the 
contractor might potentially use this know-how disparity to its benefit by putting higher prices 
for the services that should normally cost cheaper. In this manner as well, the contractor 
might employ as part of procurement the subcontractors, therefore inducing the overpricing 
and higher corruption risks (Deák and Weiner 2019, p.11). The other risky aspect of the deal 
is its financial aspect. The government will have to make the respective budgetary 
adjustments so that to account for the growth of deficit/debt share of GDP that the project 
investments will cause. The EU Commission has already warned that the deal might be 
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dangerous for Hungary’s negative debt trajectory (Ibid.). In sum, all these aspects increase 
largely Russia’s negotiating position under the contract, not Hungary’s.  
 Russia’s benefit side in the deal is huge. Not only it ties Hungary to a long-term loan, 
in the long-run as well Russia will keep the ties to Paks. Technology will also be provided by 
the Russian side, as well as nuclear fuel and nuclear waste storage (Stefanini and Hirst 2017). 
Financially Rosatom can sponsor this kind of high-scale risky projects because it receives 
large state subsidies. It then invests these subsidies into loans where loans further increase 
Rosatom’s profits (Digges 2019). On a larger scale, the Paks deal is another example of 
Russia’s intensifying energy presence on the European ground. In sum, the largest deal within 
the bilateral relations is widely assessed to be opaque and risky, raising many questions that 
are refused to be responded by the current government. On the one hand, the project can be 
perceived as part of the larger scheme of energy diversification and an attempt to decrease 
Hungary’s dependence on Russian gas and oil. However, while changing the energy resource, 
the deal ties back Hungary to the same supplier.  
4.3. Phase 3: Proximity analysis in Russo-Hungarian relations 
 For the purpose of this research design, nine press-conferences following bilateral 
meetings were analyzed. This is the amount of high-level bilateral meetings from 2013 to 
2020, including two meetings during large sports events held in Moscow and Budapest. This 
is Putin’s visit to Budapest during the Judo Championship in August of 2017, and Orbán’s 
visit to Moscow in July of 2018 as part of Football World Championship. The table below 
demonstrates the dates and locations of visits. 
 
Jan 31st, 2013 Orbán visits Moscow 
Jan 14th, 2014 Orbán visits Moscow 
Feb 17th, 2015 Putin visits Budapest 
Feb 17th, 2016 Orbán visits Moscow 
Feb 2nd, 2017 Putin visits Budapest 
Aug 28th, 2017 Putin visits Budapest, Judo Championship 
July 15th, 2018 Orbán visits Moscow, FIFA World Cup 
Sept 18th, 2018 Orbán visits Moscow 
Oct 30th, 2019 Putin visits Budapest 
Table 3. Putin’s and Orbán’s visits 
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It is important to note that the main purpose of the visits in August of 2017 and July of 2018 
was attending the respective sports events, not conducting official bilateral talks. Hence, the 
data available from these meetings is presented by the short bilateral briefings. No large 
press-conferences were held these years.  
 The textual analysis of the speeches above demonstrated that the intensity of 
‘proximity’ rhetoric has intensified throughout the years mostly on Orbán’s side. In contrast, 
Putin’s tone to describe the bilateral relations has stayed rather stable and on-point, lacking 
the mentions of the constructivist concepts that Orbán uses. The existing proximity claims can 
be divided into the following groups – shared values and historical events, shared goals and 
interests, and the group of references to non-tangible items, such as mutual respect and trust. 
 The shared historical events are mentioned only once in 2015 by Putin, whereas shared 
values are often mentioned by Orbán in the latest meetings. In 2015 Putin referred to the fact 
that his visit coincided with the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Budapest from Nazis by 
the Soviet troops. The Russian leader claimed the event marks a very important historical 
event that unites the two nations and should serve as a foundation for the growth of bilateral 
relations. Orbán, in turn, refrained from using historical references most of the times. Only 
once back in 2014, he mentioned Hungary’s communist past, saying Hungary received almost 
nothing positive as part of its communist legacy. However, this reference was not meant to 
bring up the traumatic communist past per se. Orbán further on mentioned that the 1966 
nuclear deal between the USSR and the Hungarian People’s Republic is one of the few 
positive things from the communist history of the country: 
 
There is not much of positive stuff that we received as a legacy from the 
Communist period, but the 1966 agreement between the USSR and the Hungarian 
People’s Republic on cooperation in the nuclear energy field is a good 
achievement (Orbán 2014). 
 
That is, both leaders refrain from utilizing historical narratives to shape the bilateral relations’ 
discourse. Instead, Orbán turned to employing shared cultural values’ narrative in recent 
years. This mostly pertains to Christianity as the common religion. Starting from 2018, Orbán 
extensively refers to Christianity as a shared value for Hungary and Russia. In September of 
2018, he claimed that the fact that both countries belong to the Christian culture lays the 
“special foundation” for bilateral cooperation (Orbán 2018). However, most importantly, he 




…both of us believe that in the modern world it is important to preserve and 
strengthen Christian culture. To this end, we are also making joint efforts to help 
Christians persecuted around the world (Ibid.). 
 
This gave a new dimension to the shared value. That way, in October of 2019, Orbán and 
Putin met the heads of the Christian churches in Syria. In the press-conference speech, Orbán 
articulated that bilateral cooperation on the protection of Christian communities in the Middle 
East in one of the primary spheres of bilateral cooperation. It remains unclear whether this 
new nexus of the bilateral agenda comes from Orbán’s willingness to intensify the tie through 
the shared value, or it is another motive to justify Russia’s involvement in the de-escalation of 
the conflict in Syria which Hungary was loudly supporting. Probably this is meant to serve 
both purposes. One way or another, Christianity as a shared value became the new streamline 
shaping bilateral discourse in the past two meetings. 
 Another group of narratives identified in the speeches is shared goals and interests. 
Similarly to the emergence of Christianity narrative, the narrative of the joint interest in the 
deregulation of the Syrian conflict has emerged in Orbán’s rhetoric lately. Back in 2016, he 
established the connection between Russia’s involvement in Syria and Hungary’s interest – he 
said it was in Hungary’s interest to de-escalate the Syrian conflict since Hungary and the rest 
of the EU suffer from migration crisis as the effect of the conflict:  
 
Thank you, Mr President, for the arguments with which you have outlined the role 
played by you in resolving the crisis in the Middle East, and your plans for the 
future. We highly appreciate these, as all Europe – including Hungary – is 
suffering from the effects of the migrant crisis. Furthermore, we appreciate all 
efforts – including Russia’s efforts – aimed at resolving the situation of crisis 
areas, in order to halt flows of migrants. On this issue, we wish international 
efforts every success (Orbán 2016). 
 
Since then an interesting nexus has established in Orbán’s rhetoric. Throughout the 2016-
2019 meetings, Orbán was stressing the importance of Russia’s engagement in the conflict 
and thanking Putin for the information provided on Russia’s actions. Hence, a certain role 
division has emerged in this scenario – Russia as the acting party and an informant and 
Hungary as a third party that receives the collateral benefit. The shared vision of the conflict 
has been brought up by Orbán at least the past four years. 
 Another group of proximity references includes mentions of shared interests. This 
narrative has been present in the bilateral discourse since the beginning of the relationship. 
Both Putin and Orbán mentioned since 2013 onwards that they are interested in partnership 
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and cooperation. Putin’s speeches though did not alter much throughout the years. Keeping 
them concise, the Russian leader briefly mentions the main areas of cooperation (trade, gas 
deals, Paks) and the interest in Hungary as in the buyer of gas and potential transit country for 
gas supplies: 
…We are going to make everything so that to ensure the supplies to Hungary. 
Hungary is a reliable, solvent and stable partner. Ourselves [we] are interested in 
the supplies of our raw materials to the Hungarian market and we will be looking 
for all the possible ways to transform these plans into practice. Absolutely and for 
sure – we will find them (Putin 2017). 
 
Orbán’s mentions, in turn, took geopolitical spins at some point. Since 2017, he articulates 
that Russia is Hungary’s important partner despite belonging to a different geopolitical world, 
implying Hungarian membership in NATO vis-à-vis Russia. He, later on, started making 
references to Hungary’s positioning in-between Russia and West, claiming it is in everyone’s 
interest for the two to be on good terms. In his opinion, Hungary’s primary interest is for 
Russia and the West to be on good terms because when they are not, Hungary suffers: 
 
Hungary’s interest is clear. We have learnt a simple historical lesson over the past 
hundred years or so: when there have been tensions and conflicts between the 
eastern and western halves of Europe, the Hungarians have always been adversely 
affected; and when there has been cooperation, we have always benefited. So 
Hungary’s national interest is for cooperation between the two halves of Europe to 
be as good as possible – and, within this, for the Russian-Hungarian system of 
relations to also be as good as possible (Orbán 2018). 
 
In 2019 his geopolitical contextualization zoomed out even further. Orbán said historically 
Hungary has found itself in the triangle between Moscow, Berlin and Istanbul, hence, 
Hungary strives to make these great powers interested in the maximization of Hungarian 
success (Orbán 2019). Therefore, cooperation with Russia falls into this category (Ibid.). 
 The main shared interest/vision that the leaders mention since the 2015 meeting is the 
dropping of the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions. Since 2015, Orbán keeps mentioning in the 
bilateral meetings that the sanctions impede the economic growth of the bilateral relations. In 
2017, he said: “Anti-Russian politics have become the fashion. It has been within this 
atmosphere that we have had to protect our economic relations and preserve as much of them 
as we can” (Orbán 2017). The Prime Minister’s anti-sanctions rhetoric was also intensively 
demonstrated in the European circles. Within the EU he was the largest critic of the sanctions 
and rooted a lot for dropping them, arguing they harm the trade. However, due to 
constitutional constraints, Hungary officially voted for all the rounds of sanctions. During the 
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bilateral meetings, Orbán keeps saying that it is in Hungary’s best interest for the relations 
between the EU and Russia to normalize. 
 Lastly, the speeches contain a fair amount of references to concepts of trust and 
respect. Orbán especially puts more emphasis on trust as the cornerstone of the bilateral 
relations. In 2015 during the Q&A session, the Hungarian leader praised Putin for the 
reliability and trustworthiness, saying he trusts the agreements he came to with Putin: “… 
everything that I have ever agreed on with Mr President up until this point – it pertains to any 
issue – Russia has always completed it” (Orbán 2015). He also often mentions mutual respect 
and respect of Russia and Russian culture: 
 
The kind of respect and recognition we have for Russia is, first and foremost, the 
respect for the Russian culture. This high esteem of the Russian cultural legacy 
grants an excellent basis for the development of our economic relations. We 
consider Russia to be a great power (Orbán 2013). 
 
Putin too keeps saying that Hungary is Russia’s reliable and trustworthy partner throughout 
every meeting. He said it during the meetings of 2016, 2017 and 2018. However, in Putin’s 
case, this seems to be an opening cliché phrase. Putin tends to call all the foreign parties 
‘partners’, even adversary ones. 
 In sum, the analysis of proximity within the leaders’ speeches shows that it is largely 
shaped and reinforced by the Hungarian side. Orbán employs the narratives of shared values, 
shared interests, shared vision of events. This eventually intensifies the non-tangible aspect of 
the relations. Putin, in contrast, keeps the speeches concise, repeating the key points from year 
to year, emphasizing only the value of Hungary as a trustworthy partner in Europe and a 













Chapter 5. Results’ discussion and conclusions 
Drawing upon the evidence sourced from primary and secondary data, it is now 
possible to zoom out to discuss what the results of the analysis stand for in the larger research 
design of this project and whether they potentially answer the central research question. 
5.1. Results’ discussion 
 The previous sections have demonstrated that the energy relationship between Russia 
and Hungary is double-faceted. On the one hand, as the analysis of strategic documentation in 
Phase 1 has demonstrated - the energy insecurity perception is there for Hungary. The latest 
strategies produced by the government reflect it – Hungary realizes the need for the 
diversification of suppliers, supply routes and types of supply. The ‘inequality’ assessment 
within the energy tie between Russia and Hungary in Phase 2 has indicated Hungary’s heavy 
reliance on Russia’s energy imports, especially on natural gas. In this regard, the analysis of 
‘reciprocity’, i.e. reciprocal deals in Phase 2, demonstrated the following. The data analysis 
suggests that Orbán’s government reached reciprocity with Russia on Russia-backed projects 
while also supporting non-Russia backed projects. The government simultaneously rooted for 
the competing South Stream and Nabucco, as well as for Russia-backed Turkstream later. 
This can be explained by the energy strategy’s goal of maximum diversification. To move 
away from its unilateral reliance on Russian imports of natural gas, Hungary seeks solutions 
across alternative sources of energy (e.g. nuclear, LNG or renewables), new suppliers (e.g. 
Caspian Sea and Middle Eastern countries) and new supply routes (e.g. Nabucco). However, 
on the other hand, it also realizes that there is a limited option of escaping dependence on 
Russian supplies of the natural gas in the short-term or medium-term. Russian gas remains the 
cheapest option. Hence, Orbán’s second and third cabinets expressed commitment both to 
Russia-backed and non-Russia backed projects. Namely, while still relying on Russia as a 
dominant supplier, Hungary supports alternative supply routes from Russia bypassing 
Ukraine, including the cancelled South Stream and the upcoming branch of Turkstream. The 
willingness for the transit routes to bypass Ukraine is the result of two gas supply crises of 
2006 and 2009. Due to them, Hungary has learned two lessons – gas storage for the 
emergencies like this is essential and unstable political relations between the supplying 
country and one of the transit ones may directly affect Hungary’s access to the gas supplies. 
At the same time, Orbán’s governments were also open to the supplies from the Caspian and 
Middle Eastern supplies via the Nabucco pipeline.  
The ambiguity of this tie has been seen through some other details of the key 
reciprocal deals presented above. The data suggests that to satisfy its short-term goals, such as 
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electoral victory, the Fidesz’s government sought to secure handy contract concessions from 
the Russian energy giant Gazprom. As LTSCs tend to be unfavourable to the client, namely, 
due to pricing and take-or-pay provisions being salient issues, the concessions from the 
supplier, hence, are of great importance. At crucial for the Fidesz’s government moments, 
such as afore the 2014 parliamentary elections, the evidence suggests that such concessions 
from Gazprom’s side were made. While this kind of concessions is not unprecedented for 
Gazprom, within the CEE region this particular case is rather peculiar, especially considering 
the timing that coincided with the upcoming elections. Moreover, as the evidence points out, 
the bundle of concessions also coincided with the time of signing of the Paks deal. Whether it 
is a coincidence or sealing of the Paks deal by Budapest has somehow incentivized 
Gazprom’s contractual concessions is hard to prove. However, the commentaries discussed 
above suggest the latter is the case. Speaking of the nuclear field, that is supposed to be the 
flagship of energy diversification, another controversy comes into play. Despite rhetorically-
set course for maximum diversification, Hungary came to Russia and tied itself to it via a 
risky and opaque loan without even conducting a bidding competition. The controversy of the 
deal is reinforced by the fact that all the related documentation has been classified by the 
Hungarian government to restrict public access to the deal-related information. The contract 
also became the reason of the infringement procedure initiated by the European Commission 
due to the deal’s state aid and transparency concerns. Even though the Hungarian government 
has managed to stand its ground and the investigation has been dropped in 2017, the expert 
community keeps questioning the feasibility of the deal as no detailed cost-and-benefits 
assessment has been presented by the government.  
To sum up the analysis of Hungary’s energy security concern and the assessment of 
inequality and reciprocity within the Hungarian-Russian energy tie, the following can be 
concluded. The energy insecurity perception for the Hungarian government is there and it 
mostly stems from its unilateral dependency on Russian natural gas supplies. Such factors as 
the 2006 and 2009 supply crises and utilities’ affordability are the primary drivers behind the 
attempts of securitization of the gas supply. In order to achieve a secure gas supply, the 
government has sought to achieve a so-called maximum diversification, as stated in the latest 
energy strategy. This implied both looking for alternative suppliers, as well as alternative 
supply routes from Russia. This ambiguity has demonstrated itself in the key energy issues 
within the Russo-Hungarian energy nexus. Chasing affordable utility prices for households 
and stable supply from Russia – Fidesz’s government reached consensus with Russian 
Gazprom on beneficial LTC provisions. This, as commentators point out, went hand-in-hand 
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with another major energy deal – a Russian loan for the renewal of Paks nuclear plant’s 
reactors. When it came to pipeline projects, Hungary’s reciprocity with Russia was there, but 
it was not exclusive on Hungary’s side. Orbán’s cabinets since 2010 supported both Russia-
backed South Stream and Turkstream to diversify the supply routes from Russia, as well as 
Russia’s competitor Nabucco pipeline to reach out to other gas suppliers in the Caspian and 
the Middle East. In sum, speaking in patron-client theory’s terms, the client, due to the 
security concerns, such as supply risks and affordability concerns, has been driven into 
patron’s orbit. This has been reinforced by the major asymmetry in the resources between the 
patron and the client – Hungary’s unilateral dependency on the Russian supplies. Hence, the 
client is forced to seek to secure reciprocal deals with the patron that would allow the client to 
diminish its insecurity level while the patron, in turn, is able to extract certain benefits too. 
Through these deals the patron, i.e. Russia, gains a strategic advantage in the client’s territory 
– it receives material pay-offs at the moment (gas contracts) and it builds up its strategic 
advantage through infrastructure [pipelines and Paks’s reactors] that will be paying off in the 
short-, medium- and long-term. However, this case deviates from the pure form of patron-
client relationship since the client is not uniquely exclusive with the partner. The peculiarity 
of the Hungarian-Russian case is that the energy insecurity of the client stems from its 
dependency on the patron and it simultaneously seeks to weaken this dependency bond as 
well as to extract the maximum benefit from it while it is still in place. However, another 
component of the relationship – proximity – has been analyzed as part of the research design 
too in an attempt to answer the central research question. 
 The reason for including the proximity analysis in the research design was the desire 
to address the unsupported claims circulating in the media and editorial commentary about the 
conceptual component of the current Russo-Hungarian relationship. The press is filled with 
headings calling the two leaders friends and labelling Hungary as Russia’s ‘Trojan Horse’ 
project (Müller 2014; Gulyás 2017; Al Jazeera 2019). Little academic research has been done 
to investigate the validity of these claims. As part of this research design, the ideological 
convergence component of the Russo-Hungarian relations was left aside on purpose. The only 
available academic study, Buzogány’s 2017 piece cited earlier in the literature review, tested 
the possibility of authoritarian diffusion and purposeful adaptation of the Russian model of 
illiberal governance by Hungary. He concluded this to be an overstretched assumption and 
that rather there is a salient overlap of mentalities combined with an interest-driven economic 
and political cooperation. Hence, leaving the assumption of ideological convergence aside, 
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this research design went on to critically evaluate another conceptual element of the bilateral 
relationship – proximity. 
 Proximity is a crucial component of the patron-client relationship and, hence, was 
analyzed through the speeches of key political figures of Hungary and Russia – Viktor Orbán 
and Vladimir Putin. The analysis indicated that the conceptual part of the relationship in 
Russo-Hungarian case is mostly built up and reinforced by the former. Within the bilateral 
rhetorical discourse, the Hungarian Prime-Minister is the one who employs the various 
proximity narratives rather than the Russian President.  It is important to note that the very 
high-level meetings between the heads of the countries are held annually – this allows for the 
regular catch-up on the bilateral issues. Whereas it is not something particularly unique – both 
of the leaders meet up with a similar frequency with the Western European leaders – it does 
stand out overall. However, it is more crucial to draw out the conclusions from the rhetoric 
itself. Not only it is Orbán who predominantly contributes to the proximity narratives, but his 
rhetoric also intensified throughout the years and took on new dimensions to it closer to 2019. 
Meanwhile, Putin’s rhetoric remained stable throughout the years – keeping it short and 
concise, the Russian leader tends to list the areas of cooperation and to emphasize the 
trustworthiness of Hungary as a partner. Orbán’s narratives include the regular references to 
shared values (Christianity), shared goals (de-escalation of the Syrian conflict, protection of 
Christian communities abroad), shared visions (the harm of anti-Russian sanctions) and 
constant mentions of trust and respect. Contrary to the headlines of the press, neither of the 
leaders employ the narratives of ideological convergence. The widely-referred Orbán’s quote 
on the admiration of illiberal governance in Russia (Orbán 2014) has not been reflected in his 
bilateral meetings with Vladimir Putin. Hence, at the level of the highest bilateral meetings, 
there is no direct evidence to support the claims about the intentional ideological convergence 
or adaptation of the Russian models of governance by the Hungarian side. However, there are 
rhetorical claims from the Hungarian leader on a rather tangible aspect of the relations – anti-
Russian sanctions. Orbán commits to his disapproval of the sanctions both in the wider 
European circles and when one-to-one with Putin. Since 2015, he emphasizes in front of Putin 
how harmful the sanctions are for the Russo-Hungarian relations and how tough it becomes to 
‘fight’ for the relationship to keep growing. Besides the references to shared goals and values, 
the anti-sanctions rhetoric is probably the hardest evidence for the intense proximity. The 
theoretical framework too emphasized how one of the manifestations of the patron-client 
rhetoric can be the client’s reaction to the patron’s adversaries. It is debatable whether the 
Hungarian anti-sanctions rhetoric is primarily driven by the national interest considerations or 
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by the willingness to back Russia. It can and, probably, is both. One way or another, it only 
adds greater credibility to the proximity to Russia. In sum, the conceptual part of the 
relationship, i.e. proximity, has been identified in the bilateral relationship through the textual 
analysis of the rhetoric. It primarily stems from the client’s side though, with the Hungarian 
leader reinforcing the narratives contributing to the perception of proximity. 
5.2. Conclusions 
 The important question is what the particular research design managed to highlight 
about the bilateral relationship. To go back to the initial research question – what is the 
cornerstone of the current Russo-Hungarian relationship - through the patron-client model, 
the analysis demonstrated that the relationship can be characterized as having patron-client 
relationship features in the energy field. This has mostly been manifested through the 
reciprocal energy deals signalling favourable and preferential treatment on both sides. The 
factor that drives this intensified cooperation is Hungary’s energy insecurity. This insecurity 
is partially the result of the unilateral dependence on Russian supplies. Hence, this ambiguity 
is also reflected in the key issues – the Hungarian government seeks ways out of the 
dependency in the long-term while also seeking the beneficial terms from this dependency 
in the short- and medium-term. On top of this, the conceptual part of the relationship is 
strongly reinforced by the narratives of shared values, goals, interests and trust, as well as 
through Hungary’s rhetorical support of Russia in the European circles on some matters, 
like sanctions. 
Moreover, as an extension to the already achieved conclusions, it is necessary to be 
aware of the following. Although not being reviewed under this research design, the overlap 
of mentalities, as Buzogány (2017) puts it, between the Russian and the Hungarian governing 
structures does take place. Democratic backslide, promotion of traditional values, violation of 
media and civil society freedoms – all this has taken place in Hungary since Orbán’s 
government was elected in 2010. Whether there is a correlation between this and the 
intensifying relationship with Russia would be challenging to prove. One way or another, 
these changes in Hungary do not push away Kremlin from closer cooperation, whereas the 
counterparts in the EU are highly troubled by them. In this respect, it would be a fair concern 
to raise whether the rapprochement with Russia combined with a democratic backslide has 
somehow to do with Budapest’s larger campaign to ‘tease’ Brussels. Namely, whether there is 
a place for some kind of pendulum politics that Hungary tries to adhere to so that to rip off the 
benefits from both sides. These claims can probably be tested if a longer time frame is taken 
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into consideration. In other words, future developments can shed more light on this 
assumption. 
 This research, in turn, has made a valuable contribution to the literature on current 
Russo-Hungarian relations. It is a critical response to the superficial commentaries labelling 
the relationship as “Russia’s Trojan Horse project”. Via identifying the gaps left out by the 
existing literature and employing a refined theoretical framework, the sketched-out research 
design brought in a fresh critical perspective to the infamous Russo-Hungarian bond. The 
main asset of this research design is that it managed to go beyond the over-used narratives 
that were not adding much validity to the general picture, such as the role of Eastern Opening 
policy or the speculations around the appropriation of the model of illiberal governance. This 
research project managed to tell the infamous story in a new way. It highlighted the very core 
of the relationship and the driving force behind it while leaving aside unsupported claims and 
speculative arguments. It has also provided further research avenues both for the scholars of 
Russo-Hungarian relations and patron-client theory. The patron-client theory has been left in 
the past of the Cold War times and is almost not used at all nowadays, only on rare occasions 
for retrospective studies. However, the case examined in this research demonstrates that since 
the end of the Cold War patron-client relations still exist but in a newly-evolved form.  
Moreover, these conclusions pave the way for certain assumptions or hypotheses for 
future research projects. The following hypotheses. Since Hungary’s energy insecurity is 
partially resulting from its dependency on the Russian supplies that, in its turn, is the result of 
historical events – pipelines built in the communist times, the 1966 nuclear cooperation 
agreement, LTSCs signed in the past – is there then some kind of a path-dependency? 
Furthermore, can an actor’s historical decisions lock him into a certain system-level path that 
would be hard to step off from? How strong can be the extent of this path-dependency – does 
it tie the actor to a historical partner long into the future? What is the role of international 
institutions in assisting the actor in breaking off past ties? Another potential research avenue 
would be exploring the role of party politics and parties’ ideology in shaping the foreign 
policy course of the country. For instance, to go into establishing the correlation between the 
party’s ideological positioning on a left-right spectrum and its foreign policy. Fruitful 
conclusions can be potentially reached via a comparative study across several cases in this 
kind of research. As per the scholars of the patron-client theory, they can derive some fresh 
insights into the theory from this research project. It would be interesting to explore the 
modern-day patron-client ties across other countries’ cases both in the energy field and, 
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